Robust Voting under Uncertainty
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Satoshi Nakada & Shmuel Nitzan & Takashi Ui, 2022. "Robust Voting under Uncertainty," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 038, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Blume, Lawrence E. & Cogley, Timothy & Easley, David A. & Sargent, Thomas J. & Tsyrennikov, Viktor, 2018.
"A case for incomplete markets,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 191-221.
- Viktor Tsyrennikov & Timothy Cogley & Thomas Sargent & David Easley & Lawrence Blume, 2014. "The Case for Incomplete Markets," 2014 Meeting Papers 1098, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Blume, Lawrence E. & Cogley, Timothy & Easley, David A. & Sargent, Thomas J. & Tsyrennikov, Viktor, 2015. "A Case for Incomplete Markets," Economics Series 313, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Kim-Sau Chung & J.C. Ely, 2007.
"Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(2), pages 447-476.
- Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1372, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Kim-Sau Chung, 2004. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 169, Econometric Society.
- Jeff Ely, 2003. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000064, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Markus K. Brunnermeier & Alp Simsek & Wei Xiong, 2014.
"A Welfare Criterion For Models With Distorted Beliefs,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(4), pages 1753-1797.
- Markus K. Brunnermeier & Alp Simsek & Wei Xiong, 2014. "A Welfare Criterion for Models with Distorted Beliefs," NBER Working Papers 20691, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wei Xiong & Alp Simsek & Markus Brunnermeier, 2014. "A Welfare Criterion for Models with Distorted Beliefs," 2014 Meeting Papers 1418, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Auster, Sarah, 2018. "Robust contracting under common value uncertainty," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
- Yaron Azrieli & Semin Kim, 2014. "Pareto Efficiency And Weighted Majority Rules," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 1067-1088, November.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012.
"Robust Mechanism Design,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 2, pages 49-96,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000593, www.najecon.org.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm380, Yale School of Management.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2004.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Li, Jiangtao, 2018. "Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 294-317.
- Itzhak Gilboa & Dov Samet & David Schmeidler, 2004.
"Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 932-938, August.
- Gilboa, I. & Samet, D. & Schmeidler, D., 2001. "Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes," Papers 2001-17, Tel Aviv.
- Itzhak Gilboa & D. Samet & D. Schmeidler, 2004. "Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes," Post-Print hal-00481249, HAL.
- Itzhak Gilboa & Dov Samet & David Schmeidler, 2001. "Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes," Game Theory and Information 0105001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gabriel Carroll, 2017. "Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 453-488, March.
- Itzhak Gilboa & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler, 2014.
"No‐Betting‐Pareto Dominance,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(4), pages 1405-1442, July.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Samuelson, Larry & Schmeidler, David, 2012. "No-Betting Pareto Dominance," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275781, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022.
"On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 494-514, November.
- Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2018. "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms," TSE Working Papers 18-938, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2021.
- Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms," Post-Print hal-03863573, HAL.
- Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2012.
"Robust Monopoly Pricing,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 13, pages 417-441,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Bergemann, Dirk & Schlag, Karl, 2011. "Robust monopoly pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2527-2543.
- Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2005. "Robust Monopoly Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1527R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2007.
- Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2007. "Robust Monopoly Pricing," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000983, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2005. "Robust Monopoly Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1527R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 2008.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989.
"Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Maxmin Expected Utility with a Non-Unique Prior," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275405, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1989. "Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior," Post-Print hal-00753237, HAL.
- Gabriel Carroll, 2019. "Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 139-166, August.
- John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(4), pages 309-309.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2016.
"Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
2065, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design," Working Papers 084_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Nitzan, Shmuel & Paroush, Jacob, 1981. "The characterization of decisive weighted majority rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 119-124.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2012.
"The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 651-665.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2011. "The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule," MPRA Paper 32716, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mongin, Philippe, 2016. "Spurious Unanimity And The Pareto Principle," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 511-532, November.
- Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2008. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 949-973, September.
- Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
- Songzi Du, 2018. "Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(5), pages 1569-1588, September.
- EINY, Ezra & LEHRER, Ehud, 1989. "Regular simple games," LIDAM Reprints CORE 850, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Fishburn, Peter C. & Gehrlein, William V., 1977. "Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 72-91, June.
- Mandler, Michael, 2005. "Harsanyi's utilitarianism via linear programming," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 85-90, July.
- Gabriel Carroll, 2015. "Robustness and Linear Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 536-563, February.
- Carrasco, Vinicius & Farinha Luz, Vitor & Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias & Monteiro, Paulo & Moreira, Humberto, 2018. "Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 245-279.
- Rae, Douglas W., 1969. "Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 40-56, March.
- Dybvig, Philip H. & Ross, Stephen A., 2003. "Arbitrage, state prices and portfolio theory," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 605-637, Elsevier.
- Einy, Ezra & Lehrer, Ehud, 1989. "Regular Simple Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(2), pages 195-207.
- Takuro Yamashita, 2015. "Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(3), pages 1223-1246.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Elise S. Brezis, 2023. "Regulating the Revolving Door of Regulators," Working Papers 2023-03, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Kishishita, Daiki, 2020. "(Not) delegating decisions to experts: The effect of uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Wanchang Zhang, 2021. "Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism," Papers 2105.05427, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
- He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022. "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
- Suzdaltsev, Alex, 2022. "Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
- Yeon-Koo Che & Weijie Zhong, 2021. "Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods," Papers 2105.02828, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
- Philippe Mongin & Marcus Pivato, 2020.
"Social preference under twofold uncertainty,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 633-663, October.
- Philippe Mongin & Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Social Preference Under Twofold Uncertainty," Working Papers hal-01985397, HAL.
- Mongin, Philippe & Pivato, Marcus, 2016. "Social preference under twofold uncertainty," MPRA Paper 71776, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mongin, Philippe & Pivato, Marcus, 2016. "Social Preference Under Twofold Uncertainty," HEC Research Papers Series 1154, HEC Paris.
- Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Robust Private Supply of a Public Good," Papers 2201.00923, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
- Tang, Rui & Zhang, Mu, 2021. "Maxmin implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
- Takashi Hayashi & Michele Lombardi, 2019. "Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(4), pages 775-816, June.
- Ethan Che, 2019. "Distributionally Robust Optimal Auction Design under Mean Constraints," Papers 1911.07103, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
- Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors," Papers 2204.13726, arXiv.org.
- Zhaolin Li & Samuel N. Kirshner, 2021. "Salesforce Compensation and Two‐Sided Ambiguity: Robust Moral Hazard with Moment Information," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(9), pages 2944-2961, September.
- Crès, Hervé & Tvede, Mich, 2018.
"Regulation of trades based on differences in beliefs,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 133-141.
- Crès, Hervé & Tvede, Mich, 2016. "Regulation of trades based on differences in beliefs," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 26, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
- Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
- Chen Li, 2022. "Preference Aggregation with a Robust Pareto Criterion," KIER Working Papers 1086, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Sen, Arunava, 2024. "Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
- McCarthy, David & Mikkola, Kalle & Thomas, Teruji, 2020.
"Utilitarianism with and without expected utility,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 77-113.
- McCarthy, David & Mikkola, Kalle & Thomas, Teruji, 2016. "Utilitarianism with and without expected utility," MPRA Paper 72578, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro, 2024.
"Auction design with heterogeneous priors,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 413-425.
- Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro, 2021. "Auction Design with Heterogeneous Priors," TSE Working Papers 21-1260, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Mar 2023.
- Pivato, Marcus, 2022.
"Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
- Marcus Pivato, 2022. "Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence," Post-Print hal-03637877, HAL.
- Wei He & Jiangtao Li & Weijie Zhong, 2024. "Rank-Guaranteed Auctions," Papers 2408.12001, arXiv.org.
- Julio Backhoff-Veraguas & Patrick Beissner & Ulrich Horst, 2022. "Robust contracting in general contract spaces," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 917-945, June.
More about this item
Keywords
majority rule; weighted majority rule; responsiveness; Knightian uncertainty;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2017-12-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DES-2017-12-18 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2017-12-18 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2017-12-18 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2017-12-18 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:hiasdp:hias-e-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ashitjp.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.