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Numerical Fiscal Rules for Economic Unions: the Role of Sovereign Spreads

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Carlos Hatchondo

    (Western University)

  • Leonardo Martinez

    (IMF)

  • Francisco Roch

    (IMF)

Abstract

We study gains from introducing a common numerical fiscal rule in a “Union” of model economies facing sovereign default risk. We show that among economies in the Union, there is significant disagreement about the common debt limit the Union should implement: the limit preferred by some economies can generate welfare losses in other economies. In contrast, a common sovereign spread limit results in higher welfare across economies in the Union.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Francisco Roch, 2022. "Numerical Fiscal Rules for Economic Unions: the Role of Sovereign Spreads," Working Papers 147, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:147
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    File URL: https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/147.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Capraru, Bogdan & Georgescu, George & Sprincean, Nicu, 2023. "Fiscal Rules, Independent Fiscal Institutions, and Sovereign Risk," Working Papers of Romania Fiscal Council 230201, Romania Fiscal Council.
    2. Leonardo Martinez & Francisco Roch & Francisco Roldán & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2023. "Sovereign debt," Chapters, in: Refet S. Gürkaynak & Jonathan H. Wright (ed.), Research Handbook of Financial Markets, chapter 17, pages 378-405, Edward Elgar Publishing.
      • Leonardo Martinez & Francisco Roch & Francisco Roldan & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2022. "Sovereign Debt," Working Papers 167, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
      • Mr. Leonardo Martinez & Mr. Francisco Roch & Francisco Roldán & Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2022. "Sovereign Debt," IMF Working Papers 2022/122, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Marcela De Castro-Valderrama & Nicolas Moreno-Arias & Juan Jose Ospina-Tejeiro, 2023. "Credibility and Bias: The Case for Implementing Both a Debt Anchor and a Balanced Budget Rule," IHEID Working Papers 09-2023, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    4. Niemann, Stefan & Prein, Timm, 2024. "Sovereign Risk under Diagnostic Expectations," VfS Annual Conference 2024 (Berlin): Upcoming Labor Market Challenges 302386, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal Rules; Sovereign Spread; Spread Limit; Debt Dilution; Debt Intolerance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics

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