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Business Training and Loan Repayment: Theory and Evidence from Microcredit in France

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Abstract

Although most Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) invest in non-financial services such as business training, empirical evidence on the impact of training on microborrowers’ performance is at best mixed. We address this issue by accounting for business training allocation and its possible effects on borrowers’ behavior. We first show empirically (using data from a French MFI) that the relationship between business training allocation and borrowers’ risk is complex and non- linear. By taking this into account, we establish a positive effect of business training on the survival time of loans. These results are robust to controlling for the MFI’s selection process. We moreover propose a theoretical explanation for the non-linear relationship between borrowers’ risk and training allocation based on reverse asymmetric information, showing that it can lead to increased MFI outreach.

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  • Renaud Bourlès & Anastasia Cozarenco & Dominique Henriet & Xavier Joutard, 2018. "Business Training and Loan Repayment: Theory and Evidence from Microcredit in France," AMSE Working Papers 1811, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1811
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    Cited by:

    1. Jumpah, Emmanuel Tetteh & Tetteh, Emmanuel Kojo & Adams, Abdulai, 2018. "Microcredit Repayment Among Smallholder Farmers: What Micofinance Institutions Need to Know," Asian Journal of Agriculture and Rural Development, Asian Economic and Social Society (AESS), vol. 8(02), January.
    2. Emmanuel Tetteh Jumpah & Emmanuel Kojo Tetteh & Abdulai Adams, 2018. "Microcredit repayment among smallholder farmers: what microfinance institutions need to know," Asian Journal of Agriculture and rural Development, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 8(2), pages 74-91, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    microcredit; business training; reverse asymmetric information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C34 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models
    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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