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Incentives that saved lives: Government regulation of accident insurance associations in Germany, 1884-1914

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  • Guinnane, Timothy W.
  • Streb, Jochen

Abstract

The German government introduced compulsory accident insurance for industrial firms in 1884. This insurance scheme was one of the main pillars of Bismarck’s famous social insurance system. The accident-insurance system achieved only one of its intended goals: it successfully compensated workers and their survivors for losses due to accidents. The accident-insurance system was less successful in limiting the growth of work-related accidents, although that goal had been a reason for the system’s creation. We trace the failure to stem the growth of accidents to faulty incentives built into the 1884 legislation. The law created mutual insurance groups that used an experience-rating system that stressed group rather than firm experience, leaving firms with little hope of saving on insurance contributions by improving the safety of their own plants. The government regulator increasingly stressed the imposition of safety rules that would force all firms to adopt certain safety practices. Econometric analysis shows that even the flawed tools available to the insurance groups were powerful, and that more consistent use would have reduced industrial accidents earlier and more extensively.

Suggested Citation

  • Guinnane, Timothy W. & Streb, Jochen, 2012. "Incentives that saved lives: Government regulation of accident insurance associations in Germany, 1884-1914," Center Discussion Papers 130879, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:yaleeg:130879
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.130879
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jopp, Tobias Alexander, 2011. "Old Times, Better Times? German Miners' Knappschaften, Pay-as-you-go Pensions, and Implicit Rates of Return, 1854–1913," Ruhr Economic Papers 238, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Labor and Human Capital; Political Economy; Public Economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N33 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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