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Insurance, size and exposure to actuarial risk: empirical evidence from nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German Knappschaften1

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  • Jopp, Tobias Alexander

Abstract

By the mid nineteenth century, German miners relied on their own job-related social insurance scheme providing them with sickness, invalidity and survivorship insurance benefits. Addressing the period from 1867 to 1913, this article investigates whether the mineworkers' insurance funds, the Knappschaften, could effectively minimise their exposure to the actuarial risk inherent in their operations – and, in fact, inherent in all such insurance schemes – by increasing the scale of pooling. Contemporary observers of the Knappschaften tended to focus on whether financial stability could be improved by exploiting economies of scale, rather than by improving the pricing techniques themselves. Evidence suggests that actuarial risk was minimised at around 5,000 contributors in a Knappschaft's pension insurance section and at about 1,000 contributors in its sickness insurance section.

Suggested Citation

  • Jopp, Tobias Alexander, 2012. "Insurance, size and exposure to actuarial risk: empirical evidence from nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German Knappschaften1," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 75-116, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:fihrev:v:19:y:2012:i:01:p:75-116_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Timothy W. Guinnane & Jochen Streb, 2012. "Incentives that saved lives: Government regulation of accident insurance associations in Germany, 1884-1914," Working Papers 1013, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    2. Guinnane, Timothy & Streb, Jochen, 2019. "Bismarck to no Effect: Fertility Decline and the Introduction of Social Insurance in Prussia," Working Papers 13, German Research Foundation's Priority Programme 1859 "Experience and Expectation. Historical Foundations of Economic Behaviour", Humboldt University Berlin.
    3. Lars Fredrik Andersson & Liselotte Eriksson, 2016. "Voluntary or compulsory? Exploring dynamics of mutual cooperative formation in Swedish health insurance at the turn of the twentieth century," Working Papers 16007, Economic History Society.
    4. Timothy Guinnane & Jochen Streb, 2012. "Incentives that Saved Lives: Government Regulation of Accident Insurance Associations in Germany, 1884–1914," Ruhr Economic Papers 0364, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    5. Lehmann-Hasemeyer, Sibylle & Streb, Jochen, 2017. "Does Social Security crowd out Private Savings? The Case of Bismarck’s System of Social Insurance," IBF Paper Series 06-17, IBF – Institut für Bank- und Finanzgeschichte / Institute for Banking and Financial History, Frankfurt am Main.
    6. Lehmann-Hasemeyer, Sibylle H. & Streb, Jochen, 2016. "Does Social Security Crowd Out Private Savings? The Case of Bismarck’s System of Social Insurance," Working Papers 1, German Research Foundation's Priority Programme 1859 "Experience and Expectation. Historical Foundations of Economic Behaviour", Humboldt University Berlin.
    7. repec:zbw:rwirep:0364 is not listed on IDEAS

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