Does farmland market regulation generate utility? Discussing arguments and actors within the German land transaction law

Farmland market regulation and the respective political instruments are very present in the current discussion, especially since the market faces big price increases. In the European Union, several instruments exist. The evaluation and discussion of those instruments is complex and shaped by subjective arguments. Not only are their utility for the society questioned, but also their accuracy and efficiency. Within those points, different concerned parties might have a different focus and different requirements to the regulation instruments. In this article, we intend to enrich and structure the discussion about farmland market regulation. We present an analytical framework for arguments and parties within farmland market regulation. As an example, the German land transaction law is broken down by process, parties and arguments. The framework allows to weight arguments individually. It implicates two results: First, considers conflicting interests in a clear form. Second, a linear utility curve can be calculated which determines the minimum share of pre-sales right executions to achieve a positive aggregated utility. Hence, the framework is able to analyze the utility of the German farmland transaction law from different perspectives.