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Target Prices, Payment Limits And Non-Market Concerns In The Design Of U.S. Agricultural Policy

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  • Hueth, Brent

Abstract

This paper examines the motivations underlying the government's choice of particular policy mechanisms for subsidizing agriculture. The analysis suggests that policies involving overproduction by relatively high-cost producers might arise from the perceived connection between the existence of relatively inefficient farm operations, and the preservation or sustainability of rural communities.

Suggested Citation

  • Hueth, Brent, 1998. "Target Prices, Payment Limits And Non-Market Concerns In The Design Of U.S. Agricultural Policy," 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT 20992, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea98:20992
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20992
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Jayet, Pierre-Alain & Picard, Pierre, 1995. "An incentive approach to land set-aside programs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 1487-1509, October.
    2. Julian M. Alston & Brian H. Hurd, 1990. "Some Neglected Social Costs of Government Spending in Farm Programs," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 72(1), pages 149-156.
    3. Lewis, Tracy R. & Feenstra, Robert & Ware, Roger, 1989. "Eliminating price supports : A political economy perspective," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 159-185, November.
    4. Bruce Gardner, 1983. "Efficient Redistribution through Commodity Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 65(2), pages 225-234.
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    7. Robert G. Chambers, 1992. "On the Design of Agricultural Policy Mechanisms," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 74(3), pages 646-654.
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    Keywords

    Agricultural and Food Policy;

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