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Game Theory and Water Resources Critical Review of its Contributions, Progress and Remaining Challenges

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  • Dinar, Ariel
  • Hogarth, Margaret

Abstract

Game Theory (GT), both in its non-cooperative (NCGT) and cooperative (CGT) forms, has been pivotal in its contribution to the analysis of important aspects related to water resources. The 1942 seminal work of Ransmeier on The Tennessee Valley Authority is still considered essential; it continues to inspire many applications related to water allocation decisions. Since Ransmeier, GT models were developed and have been applied to various aspects of water management, such as decisions on cost and benefit allocation in multi-objective multi-use water projects, conflicts and joint management of irrigation projects, management of groundwater aquifers, hydropower facilities, urban water supplies, wastewater treatment plants, and transboundary water disputes.

Suggested Citation

  • Dinar, Ariel & Hogarth, Margaret, 2015. "Game Theory and Water Resources Critical Review of its Contributions, Progress and Remaining Challenges," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 11(1-2), pages 1-139, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:fntmic:0700000066
    DOI: 10.1561/0700000066
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ambec, Stefan & Ehlers, Lars, 2008. "Sharing a river among satiable agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-50, September.
    2. Ambec, Stefan & Sprumont, Yves, 2002. "Sharing a River," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 453-462, December.
    3. Adams, Gregory & Rausser, Gordon & Simon, Leo, 1996. "Modelling multilateral negotiations: An application to California water policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 97-111, July.
    4. Aadland, David & Kolpin, Van, 1998. "Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 203-218, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ershad Oftadeh & Mojtaba Shourian & Bahram Saghafian, 2017. "An Ultimatum Game Theory Based Approach for Basin Scale Water Allocation Conflict Resolution," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 31(13), pages 4293-4308, October.
    2. Li, Zhi & Zhang, Xin & Xu, Wenchao, 2018. "Water Transactions along a River: A Multilateral Bargaining Experiment with a Veto Player," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 274048, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. Stefano Moretti & Fioravante Patrone & Ariel Dinar & Safwat Abdel-Dayem, 2016. "Sharing the Costs of Complex Water Projects: Application to the West Delta Water Conservation and Irrigation Rehabilitation Project, Egypt," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(3), pages 1-23, July.
    4. Acosta-Vega, Rick K. & Algaba, Encarnación & Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín, 2023. "Design of water quality policies based on proportionality in multi-issue problems with crossed claims," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 311(2), pages 777-788.
    5. N. Englezos & X. Kartala & P. Koundouri & M. Tsionas & A. Alamanos, 2023. "A Novel HydroEconomic - Econometric Approach for Integrated Transboundary Water Management Under Uncertainty," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 84(4), pages 975-1030, April.
    6. Rambonilaza, Tina & Rulleau, Bénédicte & Assouan, Epiphane, 2023. "On sharing the costs of public drinking water infrastructure renewal among users with different preferences," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    7. Nikolaos Nagkoulis & Konstantinos L. Katsifarakis, 2022. "Using Game Theory to Assign Groundwater Pumping Schedules," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 36(5), pages 1571-1586, March.
    8. Ali Zarei & Sayed-Farhad Mousavi & Madjid Eshaghi Gordji & Hojat Karami, 2019. "Optimal Reservoir Operation Using Bat and Particle Swarm Algorithm and Game Theory Based on Optimal Water Allocation among Consumers," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 33(9), pages 3071-3093, July.
    9. Kim Hang Pham Do, 2019. "Special Issue on Game Theory and Water Resource Management," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(01), pages 1-6, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-cooperative game theory; Cooperative game theory; Water resources; Water management;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth

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