Collective Action in Plant Breeding
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.19530
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Cited by:
- Pardey, Philip G. & Beintema, Nienke M. & Dehmer, Steven & Wood, Stanley, 2006. "Agricultural research: a growing global divide?," Food policy reports 17, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
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Keywords
Institutional and Behavioral Economics;Statistics
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