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The Rise of Government Law Enforcement in England

In: The Pursuit of Justice

Author

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  • Nicholas A. Curott
  • Edward P. Stringham

Abstract

Public choice economics is often referred to as the study of “politics without the romance” (Buchanan 1999). Instead of simply assuming that government agents are benevolent pursuers of the public good, public choice models them as real-life individuals who have desires and concerns of their own. From this perspective, it becomes natural to consider the possibility that any given government policy may have been created to satisfy private special interests rather than the interest of the general public (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). With its insistence on rigorous analytical tools and realistic methodology, the ascendance of public choice has simultaneously modernized research on the political process as well as engendered a healthy dose of skepticism regarding the desirability of previously accepted government functions. Curiously, the romantic, public interest notion of government retains a lingering influence in the scholarship on law. The romantic view of the law can even be found in the writings of the founders of public choice.1

Suggested Citation

  • Nicholas A. Curott & Edward P. Stringham, 2010. "The Rise of Government Law Enforcement in England," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Edward J. López (ed.), The Pursuit of Justice, chapter 0, pages 19-36, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-10949-0_2
    DOI: 10.1057/9780230109490_2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "Trading with Bandits," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(2), pages 303-321.
    2. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast*, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, March.
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    5. Holcombe, Randall G. (Холкомб, Рэндалл Дж.), 2015. "A Theory of the Theory of Public Goods [Теория Происхождения Теории Общественных Благ]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 4, pages 196-207.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stringham, Edward Peter & Zywicki, Todd J., 2011. "Hayekian anarchism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 290-301, May.

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