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ABC – Austria, Bloomington, Chicago: Political Economy the Ostrom Way

In: The Austrian and Bloomington Schools of Political Economy

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  • Hartmut Kliemt

Abstract

Bloomington scholars are critical of the rather wide-spread “Model Platonism” of both Austrian and Chicago economists. Their empirical, B, perspective avoids the more extreme views of both Austrian “mindful economics,” A, and Chicago “mindless economics,” C. Yet the B is not a mere convex combination of A and C. It is rather a psychologically grounded empirical evidence-oriented approach that keeps clear of the non-empirical spirit of von Mises’ and Selten’s methodological dualism on one hand and the instrumentalist and behaviorist spirit of much of neo-classical economics on the other hand.

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  • Hartmut Kliemt, 2017. "ABC – Austria, Bloomington, Chicago: Political Economy the Ostrom Way," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: The Austrian and Bloomington Schools of Political Economy, volume 22, pages 1-33, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:aaeczz:s1529-213420170000022001
    DOI: 10.1108/S1529-213420170000022001
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    Cited by:

    1. Teodor FRUNZETI & Lisa-Maria ACHIMESCU, 2019. "Institutionalism, Neo-Institutionalism And Knowledge In International Regimes And Social Sciences," Proceedings of the 11-th International Conference on Knowledge Management: Projects, Systems and Technologies, Bucharest, November 7-8, 2019. 1, Faculty of Economic Cybernetics, Statistics and Informatics, Academy of Economic Studies from Bucharest and "Carol I-st" National Defence University, Department for Management of the Defence Resources and Education.
    2. Kolev, Stefan, 2019. "Antipathy for Heidelberg, sympathy for Freiburg? Vincent Ostrom on Max Weber, Walter Eucken, and the compound history of order," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 19/6, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..

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