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Reinforcing Ethical Behavior through Organizational Architecture: A Hypothesized Relationship

In: The Nature of the New Firm

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  • Raymond O. S. Zaal

Abstract

Globalization has created new ways of doing business, new institutions to oversee them, and has introduced a spectrum of new protagonists to the international arena. Scholars and practitioners have been challenged by the evolving environment to find new ways to interact and, in the process, many of the traditional boundaries that have existed within and between organizations and institutions have become increasingly blurred. This unique compendium sheds light on these and other topics on the question of change, both within and between organizations and institutions. The contributors have expertly combined the insights of some of the biggest names in the fields of economics, business and strategic management, both present and future – and in doing so offer scholars a tailor-made, up-to-date study on the topic of economic change.

Suggested Citation

  • Raymond O. S. Zaal, 2011. "Reinforcing Ethical Behavior through Organizational Architecture: A Hypothesized Relationship," Chapters, in: Killian J. McCarthy & Maya Fiolet & Wilfred Dolfsma (ed.), The Nature of the New Firm, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14105_2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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