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Conspicuous monitoring and remote work

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  • Jensen, Nathan
  • Lyons, Elizabeth
  • Chebelyon, Eddy
  • Bras, Ronan Le
  • Gomes, Carla

Abstract

Credible monitoring of remote workers presents unique challenges that may reduce the benefits of formal organization for their management. We consider whether increasing the salience of monitor productivity without changing incentive contracts or monitoring technology leads to changes in remote worker performance. Results from a field experiment run among multi-dimensional task workers in Kenya demonstrate that increasing the visibility of monitor activity improves performance on task dimensions not being directly paid for. Our evidence is consistent with the importance of conspicuous monitoring when managers and workers are not co-located.

Suggested Citation

  • Jensen, Nathan & Lyons, Elizabeth & Chebelyon, Eddy & Bras, Ronan Le & Gomes, Carla, 2020. "Conspicuous monitoring and remote work," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 489-511.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:176:y:2020:i:c:p:489-511
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.010
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    Cited by:

    1. Laura Abrardi & Elena Grinza & Alessandro Manello & Flavio Porta, 2024. "Work from home arrangements and organizational performance in Italian SMEs: evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 67(6), pages 2821-2863, December.
    2. Kayas, Oliver G., 2023. "Workplace surveillance: A systematic review, integrative framework, and research agenda," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
    3. Agnieszka Grzelczak, 2021. "Remote Work and its Consequences for the Employee in the Time of the Covid-19 Pandemic," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(Special 5), pages 399-411.
    4. Emilio Bisetti & Benjamin Tengelsen & Ariel Zetlin‐Jones, 2022. "Moral Hazard In Remote Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1595-1623, November.
    5. Holger Herz & Christian Zihlmann, 2024. "Adverse effects of control? Evidence from a field experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(2), pages 469-488, April.
    6. Mabel Andalon & Matthew Jones, 2022. "A simple model of working from home," Australian Journal of Labour Economics (AJLE), Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre (BCEC), Curtin Business School, vol. 25(2), pages 193-214.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moral hazard; Monitoring; Remote work; Field experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products

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