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Takuro Yamashita

Personal Details

First Name:Takuro
Middle Name:
Last Name:Yamashita
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pya303
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/tytytytytytyty001/

Affiliation

Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Toulouse, France
http://www.tse-fr.eu/
RePEc:edi:tsetofr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Bianchi, Milo & Yamashita, Takuro, 2024. "Optimal Investment in Network Infrastructures," TSE Working Papers 1560, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  2. Chia-Hui Chen & Hulya Eraslan & Junichiro Ishida & Takuro Yamashita, 2024. "Optimal Feedback Dynamics Against Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation," ISER Discussion Paper 1247, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  3. Van Der Straeten, Karine & Yamashita, Takuro, 2023. "On the veil-of-ignorance principle: welfare-optimal information disclosure in Voting," TSE Working Papers 23-1463, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  4. Smolin, Alex & Yamashita, Takuro, 2023. "Information Design in Games: Certification Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 18282, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Daniil Larionov & Hien Pham & Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2022_377, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  6. Fumitoshi Moriya & Takuro Yamashita, 2022. "Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations," Post-Print hal-04050661, HAL.
  7. Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2022. "Adverse selection and bounded rationality: an impossibility theorem," Post-Print hal-04047796, HAL.
  8. Takuro Yamashita & Niccolò Lomys, 2022. "A mediator approach to mechanism design with limited commitment," Post-Print hal-04051960, HAL.
  9. Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms," Post-Print hal-03863573, HAL.
  10. Smolin, Alex & Yamashita, Takuro, 2022. "Information Design in Concave Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 17066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Alex Smolin & Takuro Yamashita, 2022. "Information Design in Smooth Games," Papers 2202.10883, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
  12. Yamashita, Takuro & Sarkisian, Roberto, 2021. "Large mechanism design with moment-based allocation externality," TSE Working Papers 21-1241, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  13. Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro, 2021. "Auction Design with Heterogeneous Priors," TSE Working Papers 21-1260, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Mar 2023.
  14. Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "Type-contingent Information Disclosure," TSE Working Papers 21-1242, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  15. Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2021. "Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes," OSIPP Discussion Paper 21E006, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
  16. Nozomu Muto & Yasuhiro Shirata & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Revenue-capped efficient auctions," Post-Print hal-03049103, HAL.
  17. Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "A Note on Adverse Selection and Bounded Rationality," OSIPP Discussion Paper 20E002, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
  18. Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Optimal Public Information Disclosure by Mechanism Designer," TSE Working Papers 18-936, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  19. Miura, Shintaro & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Divergent Interpretation and Divergent Prediction in Communication," TSE Working Papers 18-939, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  20. Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Revenue guarantees in auctions with a (correlated) common prior and additional information," TSE Working Papers 18-937, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  21. Kunimoto, Takashi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Order on Types based on Monotone Comparative Statics," TSE Working Papers 18-942, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  22. Kojima, Fuhito & Yamashita, Takuro, 2016. "Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency," TSE Working Papers 16-677, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  23. MORIYA, Fumitoshi & 森谷, 文利 & YAMASHITA, Takuro & 山下, 拓朗, 2015. "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-18, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
  24. Yamashita, Takuro, 2014. "Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies, with Applications to Auctions and Bilateral Trade," TSE Working Papers 14-513, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  25. Yamashita, Takuro, 2014. "Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation," TSE Working Papers 14-514, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

Articles

  1. Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro, 2024. "Auction design with heterogeneous priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 413-425.
  2. Roberto Sarkisian & Takuro Yamashita, 2024. "Optimal student allocation with peer effects," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(3), pages 551-571, September.
  3. Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2023. "Adverse selection and bounded rationality: an impossibility theorem," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 439-444, July.
  4. Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Smorodinsky, Rann & Yamashita, Takuro, 2023. "Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
  5. Fumitoshi Moriya & Takuro Yamashita, 2022. "Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 112, pages 444-451, May.
  6. Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 494-514, November.
  7. Nozomu Muto & Yasuhiro Shirata & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 1284-1320.
  8. Fumitoshi Moriya & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 173-186, January.
  9. Kunimoto, Takashi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2020. "Order on types based on monotone comparative statics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  10. Miura, Shintaro & Yamashita, Takuro, 2020. "Maximal miscommunication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  11. Kojima, Fuhito & Yamashita, Takuro, 2017. "Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
  12. Yamashita, Takuro, 2015. "Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 267-279.
  13. Takuro Yamashita, 2015. "Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(3), pages 1223-1246.
  14. Takuro Yamashita, 2010. "Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 791-801, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Takuro Yamashita & Niccolò Lomys, 2022. "A mediator approach to mechanism design with limited commitment," Post-Print hal-04051960, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Attar & Lorenzo Bozzoli & Roland Strausz, 2024. "Mediated Renegotiation," Working Papers hal-04532231, HAL.

  2. Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms," Post-Print hal-03863573, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2018. "Restricted Environments and Incentive Compatibility in Interdependent Values Models," Working Papers 1024, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Wei He & Jiangtao Li & Weijie Zhong, 2024. "Rank-Guaranteed Auctions," Papers 2408.12001, arXiv.org.
    3. Satoshi Nakada & Shmuel Nitzan & Takashi Ui, 2022. "Robust Voting under Uncertainty," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 038, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
    4. Tilman Börgers & Jiangtao Li, 2019. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(6), pages 2003-2035, November.
    5. Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Sen, Arunava, 2024. "Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    6. Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro, 2024. "Auction design with heterogeneous priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 413-425.
    7. Wanchang Zhang, 2021. "Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism," Papers 2105.05427, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    8. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Robust Private Supply of a Public Good," Papers 2201.00923, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    9. Tilman Börgers, 2017. "(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(2), pages 73-82, June.

  3. Alex Smolin & Takuro Yamashita, 2022. "Information Design in Smooth Games," Papers 2202.10883, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.

    Cited by:

    1. Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023. "Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport," Papers 2311.02889, arXiv.org.
    2. Masaki Miyashita & Takashi Ui, 2023. "LQG Information Design," Papers 2312.09479, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.

  4. Yamashita, Takuro & Sarkisian, Roberto, 2021. "Large mechanism design with moment-based allocation externality," TSE Working Papers 21-1241, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "A Case for Tiered School Systems," Working Papers 202205, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
    2. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "Sorting and Grading," Papers 2208.10894, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.

  5. Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "Type-contingent Information Disclosure," TSE Working Papers 21-1242, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    2. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "Sorting and Grading," Papers 2208.10894, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.

  6. Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2021. "Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes," OSIPP Discussion Paper 21E006, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.

    Cited by:

    1. Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "A Note on Adverse Selection and Bounded Rationality," OSIPP Discussion Paper 20E002, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.

  7. Nozomu Muto & Yasuhiro Shirata & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Revenue-capped efficient auctions," Post-Print hal-03049103, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Zhonghao Shui, 2023. "Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 925-951, September.
    2. Sebastián D. Bauer, 2023. "Buyers’ welfare maximizing auction design," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 555-567, June.
    3. Muto, Nozomu & Shirata, Yasuhiro, 2017. "Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 75-84.

  8. Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "A Note on Adverse Selection and Bounded Rationality," OSIPP Discussion Paper 20E002, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.

    Cited by:

    1. Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2021. "Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes," OSIPP Discussion Paper 21E006, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.

  9. Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Optimal Public Information Disclosure by Mechanism Designer," TSE Working Papers 18-936, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Bara Kim & Seung Han Yoo, 2022. "Grand Mechanism and Population Uncertainty," Discussion Paper Series 2204, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    2. Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "Type-contingent Information Disclosure," TSE Working Papers 21-1242, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

  10. Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Revenue guarantees in auctions with a (correlated) common prior and additional information," TSE Working Papers 18-937, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Benjamin Brooks & Songzi Du, 2021. "Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1313-1360, May.
    2. Daniil Larionov & Hien Pham & Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2022_377, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

  11. Kojima, Fuhito & Yamashita, Takuro, 2016. "Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency," TSE Working Papers 16-677, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2023. "Optimal information structures in bilateral trade," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    2. Jinpeng Ma & Qiongling Li, 2016. "Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 1-44, December.
    3. Margaretha Gansterer & Richard F. Hartl, 2018. "Centralized bundle generation in auction-based collaborative transportation," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 40(3), pages 613-635, July.
    4. Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021. "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    5. Suehyun Kwon, 2018. "Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products," CESifo Working Paper Series 7394, CESifo.
    6. Song, Yangwei, 2023. "Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 56-87.
    7. Dütting, Paul & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Roughgarden, Tim, 2017. "Modularity and greed in double auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 83199, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Hashimoto, Tadashi, 2018. "The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 708-733.
    9. Kiho Yoon, 2021. "Robust double auction mechanisms," Papers 2102.00669, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    10. Pavlo Prokopovych & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2022. "On nondegenerate equilibria of double auctions with several buyers and a price floor," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 625-654, April.
    11. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
    12. Nejat Anbarci & Jaideep Roy, 2018. "Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(1), pages 1-9, January.
    13. Song, Yangwei, 2022. "Approximate Bayesian Implementation and Exact Maxmin Implementation: An Equivalence," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 362, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    14. Kwanghyun Kim, 2024. "On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 579-608, June.

  12. MORIYA, Fumitoshi & 森谷, 文利 & YAMASHITA, Takuro & 山下, 拓朗, 2015. "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-18, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.

    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2018. "Interactive Information Design," Working Papers hal-01933896, HAL.
    2. Li, Fei & Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2023. "Global manipulation by local obfuscation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    3. Fumitoshi Moriya & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 173-186, January.
    4. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid & Denis Shishkin, 2024. "Perfect Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2402.06765, arXiv.org.
    5. Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2024. "Persuasion and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(7), pages 2451-2487.
    6. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 16543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Hiroto Sato, 2023. "Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 269-285, June.

  13. Yamashita, Takuro, 2014. "Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies, with Applications to Auctions and Bilateral Trade," TSE Working Papers 14-513, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Borgers, Tilman & Smith, Doug, 2011. "Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules," MPRA Paper 37027, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Gabriel Carroll, 2015. "Robustness and Linear Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 536-563, February.

  14. Yamashita, Takuro, 2014. "Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation," TSE Working Papers 14-514, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2020. "Self-rejecting mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 434-457.

Articles

  1. Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Smorodinsky, Rann & Yamashita, Takuro, 2023. "Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.

    Cited by:

    1. Federico Echenique & Teddy Mekonnen & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2024. "Diversity in Choice as Majorization," Papers 2407.17589, arXiv.org.
    2. Roberto Corrao & Yifan Dai, 2023. "The Bounds of Mediated Communication," Papers 2303.06244, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    3. Atulya Jain & Vianney Perchet, 2024. "Calibrated Forecasting and Persuasion," Papers 2406.15680, arXiv.org.
    4. Lily Ling Yang, 2024. "Information Design with Costly State Verifi cation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_502, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    5. Zeng, Yishu, 2023. "Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    6. Kai Hao Yang & Alexander K. Zentefis, 2023. "Monotone Function Intervals: Theory and Applications," Papers 2302.03135, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
    7. Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen & Yimeng Zhang, 2024. "Coarse Information Design," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 314, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

  2. Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 494-514, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Nozomu Muto & Yasuhiro Shirata & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 1284-1320.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Fumitoshi Moriya & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 173-186, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Miura, Shintaro & Yamashita, Takuro, 2020. "Maximal miscommunication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).

    Cited by:

    1. Makoto Shimoji, 2022. "Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 451-481, November.

  6. Kojima, Fuhito & Yamashita, Takuro, 2017. "Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Takuro Yamashita, 2015. "Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(3), pages 1223-1246.

    Cited by:

    1. Mukherjee, Saptarshi, 2018. "Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: Some results on compromise alternatives," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 384-391.
    2. Benjamin Brooks & Songzi Du, 2021. "Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1313-1360, May.
    3. Tianjiao Dai & Juuso Toikka, 2022. "Robust Incentives for Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1583-1613, July.
    4. Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2018. "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms," TSE Working Papers 18-938, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2021.
    5. Satoshi Nakada & Shmuel Nitzan & Takashi Ui, 2022. "Robust Voting under Uncertainty," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 038, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
    6. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    7. Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve, 2017. "Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 613-631.
    8. Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Sen, Arunava, 2024. "Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    9. Hagen, Martin & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2021. "Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    10. Jiangtao Li & Piotr Dworczak, 2020. "Are simple mechanisms optimal when agents are unsophisticated?," GRAPE Working Papers 42, GRAPE Group for Research in Applied Economics.
    11. Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," Discussion Papers 17-04, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    12. Mariann Ollar & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Implementation via Transfers with Identical but Unknown Distributions," Working Papers 1126, Barcelona School of Economics.
    13. Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve & Sen, Arunava, 2019. "Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 229-243.
    14. Chen, Yi-Chun & Li, Jiangtao, 2018. "Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 294-317.
    15. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Information-Robust Optimal Auctions," Papers 2205.04137, arXiv.org.

  8. Takuro Yamashita, 2010. "Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 791-801, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2021. "A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Analysis in Competing Mechanism Games," Department of Economics Working Papers 2021-09, McMaster University.
    2. Seungjin Han, 2014. "Robust Competitive Auctions," Department of Economics Working Papers 2014-04, McMaster University, revised Oct 2014.
    3. Han, Seungjin, 2011. "Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection," Microeconomics.ca working papers seungjin_han-2011-10, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 02 Apr 2013.
    4. Jens Leth Hougaard & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2022. "Optimal Management of Evolving Hierarchies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(8), pages 6024-6038, August.
    5. Peters, Michael, 2010. "On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2010-18, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.
    6. Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2022. "Competitive nonlinear pricing under adverse selection," Working Papers hal-03629592, HAL.
    7. Seungjin Han, 2021. "Robust Equilibria in General Competing Mechanism Games," Department of Economics Working Papers 2021-07, McMaster University.
    8. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2022. "Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022-05, McMaster University.
    9. Iván Arribas & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 2014. "Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0614, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
    10. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser, 2015. "On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition," Working Papers 2015-632, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    11. Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian, 2010. "A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2010-17, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Oct 2013.
    12. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019. "Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games," TSE Working Papers 19-1021, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    13. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2011. "Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness," CEIS Research Paper 196, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 10 Jun 2011.
    14. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Pavan, Alessandro, 2021. "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms," TSE Working Papers 21-1227, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Dec 2023.
    15. Michael Peters, 2014. "Competing mechanisms," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(2), pages 373-397, May.
    16. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019. "Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples," TSE Working Papers 19-1014, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Sep 2020.
    17. Peters, Michael & Szentes, Balazs, 2009. "Definable and Contractible Contracts," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2009-7, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 13 May 2010.
    18. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle," CEIS Research Paper 201, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 30 Jun 2011.
    19. Seungjin Han, 2019. "General Competing Mechanisms with Frictions," Department of Economics Working Papers 2019-09, McMaster University.
    20. Seungjin Han, 2018. "Neutralized Competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 2018-11, McMaster University.
    21. Galperti, Simone, 2015. "Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 648-667.
    22. Han Seungjin, 2016. "Sellers’ Implicit Collusion in Directed Search Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 711-738, June.
    23. Li, Anqi & Xing, Yiqing, 2020. "Intermediated implementation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    24. Seungjin Han, 2015. "Competing Mechanisms: Theory and Applications in Directed Search Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2015-07, McMaster University, revised May 2016.
    25. Sambuddha Ghosh & Seungjin Han, 2012. "Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-03, McMaster University, revised May 2013.
    26. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 205, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 04 Jul 2011.
    27. Peters, Michael, 2015. "Reciprocal contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 102-126.
    28. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2013. "Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 62-70.
    29. Peters, Michael, 2014. "Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2014-7, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.
    30. Gwenaël Piaser, 2014. "Incentive compatible mechanisms in multiprincipal multiagent games," Working Papers 2014-49, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 27 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (25) 2014-08-16 2014-08-20 2016-01-03 2016-07-30 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2020-03-16 2021-09-13 2021-09-20 2021-09-20 2021-12-06 2021-12-06 2022-03-28 2022-04-11 2023-01-09 2023-02-13 2023-02-20 2023-09-18 2024-07-22 2024-09-23. Author is listed
  2. NEP-DES: Economic Design (17) 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2020-03-16 2021-09-06 2021-09-06 2021-09-13 2021-12-06 2021-12-06 2022-03-28 2022-04-11 2023-01-09 2023-02-13 2023-02-20 2024-07-22 2024-09-23. Author is listed
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (10) 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2021-12-06 2022-03-28 2022-04-11 2023-01-09 2023-02-20 2023-09-18. Author is listed
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (9) 2014-08-16 2014-08-20 2016-01-03 2021-09-13 2021-09-20 2021-09-20 2022-03-28 2022-04-11 2024-09-23. Author is listed
  5. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (5) 2021-09-06 2021-09-06 2021-09-13 2021-09-20 2021-09-20. Author is listed
  6. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (3) 2016-07-30 2022-03-28 2024-09-23
  7. NEP-CSE: Economics of Strategic Management (2) 2014-08-20 2016-07-30
  8. NEP-CWA: Central and Western Asia (2) 2021-09-13 2021-09-20
  9. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (2) 2020-03-16 2021-09-20
  10. NEP-BAN: Banking (1) 2022-04-11
  11. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (1) 2020-03-16
  12. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2023-09-18
  13. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2020-03-16
  14. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2022-04-11
  15. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2024-09-23
  16. NEP-TRE: Transport Economics (1) 2024-09-23

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