Report NEP-DES-2022-04-11

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Simon Jantschgi & Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski & Marek Pycia, 2022. "On market prices in double auctions," ECON - Working Papers 404, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
• Simon Jantschgi & Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski & Marek Pycia, 2022. "Markets and transaction costs," ECON - Working Papers 405, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Sep 2022.
• Martino Banchio & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2022. "Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design," Papers 2202.05947, arXiv.org.
• SangMok Lee, 2022. "Preference Learning in School Choice Problems," Papers 2202.08366, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
• DoÄŸan, B. & Erdil, A., 2022. "Widening Access and Managing Recruitment with Smart Targets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2217, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
• Anna Bogomolnaia & Herve Moulin, 2022. "Fair Division with Money and Prices," Papers 2202.08117, arXiv.org.
• Oihane Gallo & Bettina Klaus, 2022. "Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 22.03, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
• Yamashita, Takuro & Smolin, Alex, 2022. "Information Design in Concave Games," TSE Working Papers 22-1313, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
• Dirk Bergemann & Yang Cai & Grigoris Velegkas & Mingfei Zhao, 2022. "Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2324, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
• Ian M. Schmutte & Nathan Yoder, 2022. "Information Design for Differential Privacy," Papers 2202.05452, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.