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Unmediated communication in games with (in)complete information: the 4-player case

Author

Listed:
  • Marie Laclau
  • Péter Vida
  • Helmuts Azacis

    (CY Cergy Paris Université, THEMA)

Abstract

We show that essentially every correlated equilibrium of any finite game with complete information with four players can be implemented as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions in the underlying game, players exchange cheap talk messages. In particular, we improve on the result of B´ar´any (1992) and Gerardi (2004). And our result generalizes to sequential equilibria and to games with incomplete information, i.e. to the set of (regular) communication equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie Laclau & Péter Vida & Helmuts Azacis, 2024. "Unmediated communication in games with (in)complete information: the 4-player case," THEMA Working Papers 2024-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2024-07
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    File URL: https://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/pdf/2024-07.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    nmediated communication; sequential rationality; correlated equilibria; communication equilibria; communication protocols;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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