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Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents

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  • Helmuts Āzacis

    (Cardiff University)

Abstract

We study repeated implementation in a model with overlapping generations of agents. A social choice function selects an alternative in each period as a function of preferences of those agents who are alive in that period. When the agents’ preferences do not change during their lifetime, we show that any social choice function satisfying a mild unanimity condition is repeatedly implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium if there are at least three agents and they live sufficiently long. When the agents’ preferences change every period, we show that only efficient social choice functions can be repeatedly implementable if the agents live sufficiently long.

Suggested Citation

  • Helmuts Āzacis, 2020. "Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(2), pages 275-299, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:55:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01240-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01240-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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