Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01353-w
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More about this item
Keywords
Sophisticated voting; Iterated weak dominance; Majoritarianism; Scoring rules; Borda rule; Approval voting;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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