Fabrice Valognes

Personal Details

First Name:	Fabrice
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Valognes
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pva571
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management (CREM)

Rennes/Caen, France
https://crem.univ-rennes.fr/
RePEc:edi:crmrefr (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Moussa Diaby & Hélène Ferrer & Fabrice Valognes, 2013. "A Social Choice Approach to Primary Resource Management: The rubber tree Case in Africa," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201305, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
   • Diaby, Moussa & Ferrer, Hélène & Valognes, Fabrice, 2013. "A social choice approach to primary resource management: The rubber tree case in Africa," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 8-14.
   • Moussa Diaby & Hélène Ferrer & Fabrice Valognes, 2013. "A social choice approach to primary resource management: The rubber tree case in Africa," Post-Print halshs-00804065, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Min, Shi & Bai, Junfei & Wang, Xiaobing & Waibel, Hermann, 2024. "Does an inconsistent land tenure certificate affect technical efficiency of smallholder rubber farming: Evidence from a panel data in Southwest China," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).

2. Fabrice Valognes & Hélène Ferrer & Moussa Diaby & André Clément-Demange, 2011. "A comprehensive decision approach for rubber tree planting management in Africa," Post-Print halshs-00650533, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Diaby, Moussa & Ferrer, Hélène & Valognes, Fabrice, 2013. "A social choice approach to primary resource management: The rubber tree case in Africa," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 8-14.
      • Moussa Diaby & Hélène Ferrer & Fabrice Valognes, 2013. "A Social Choice Approach to Primary Resource Management: The rubber tree Case in Africa," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201305, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
      • Moussa Diaby & Hélène Ferrer & Fabrice Valognes, 2013. "A social choice approach to primary resource management: The rubber tree case in Africa," Post-Print halshs-00804065, HAL.
   2. Govindan, Kannan & Jepsen, Martin Brandt, 2016. "ELECTRE: A comprehensive literature review on methodologies and applications," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 250(1), pages 1-29.

3. Moussa Diaby & Fabrice Valognes & André Clément-Demange, 2010. "Utilisation d'une méthode multicritère d'aide à la décision pour le choix des clones d'hévéa à planter en Afrique," Post-Print halshs-00565246, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Diaby, Moussa & Ferrer, Hélène & Valognes, Fabrice, 2013. "A social choice approach to primary resource management: The rubber tree case in Africa," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 8-14.
      • Moussa Diaby & Hélène Ferrer & Fabrice Valognes, 2013. "A Social Choice Approach to Primary Resource Management: The rubber tree Case in Africa," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201305, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
      • Moussa Diaby & Hélène Ferrer & Fabrice Valognes, 2013. "A social choice approach to primary resource management: The rubber tree case in Africa," Post-Print halshs-00804065, HAL.
   2. Fabrice Valognes & Hélène Ferrer & Moussa Diaby & André Clément-Demange, 2011. "A comprehensive decision approach for rubber tree planting management in Africa," Post-Print halshs-00650533, HAL.

4. van Ypersele, Tanguy & Hotte, Louis & Valognes, Fabrice, 2003. "Property Crime with Private Protection: A Market-for-Offenses Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 3782, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Louis Hotte & Fabrice Valognes & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2009. "Property Crime with Private Protection: A Market-for-Offenses Approach," Working Papers 0901E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.

   Cited by:

   1. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Private protection against crime when property value is private information," DICE Discussion Papers 91, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
      • Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2012. "Private Protection against Crime when Property Value is Private Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 3888, CESifo.
      • Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Private protection against crime when property value is private information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 73-79.

5. Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000. "On the Likelihood of Condorcet's Profiles," Papers 223, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
   • Fabrice Valognes & Vincent Merlin & Monica Tataru, 2002. "On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(1), pages 193-206.
   • Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes & M. Tataru, 2002. "The likelihood of Condorcet's profiles," Post-Print halshs-00069518, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2019. "The Likelihood of the Consistency of Collective Rankings under Preferences Aggregation with Four Alternatives using Scoring Rules: A General Formula and the Optimal Decision Rule," Post-Print hal-01757742, HAL.
      • Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2019. "The Likelihood of the Consistency of Collective Rankings Under Preferences Aggregation with Four Alternatives Using Scoring Rules: A General Formula and the Optimal Decision Rule," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 53(4), pages 1377-1395, April.
   2. Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Post-Print halshs-00443854, HAL.
      • Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 289-316, August.
   3. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Condorcet vs. Borda in Light of a Dual Majoritarian Approach," Working Papers 2010-07, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
      • Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2011. "Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 151-162, August.
   4. Aleksandras KRYLOVAS & Natalja KOSAREVA & Edmundas Kazimieras ZAVADSKAS, 2016. "Statistical Analysis of KEMIRA Type Weights Balancing Methods," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 0(3), pages 19-39, September.
   5. Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004. "The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 343-361, November.
      • Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes, 2004. "The Impact of Indifferent Voters on the Likelihood of some Voting Paradoxes," Post-Print halshs-00069089, HAL.
   6. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2009. "A note on Condorcet's other paradox," Post-Print hal-01243468, HAL.
      • William v. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2009. "A note on Condorcet's other paradox," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 2000-2007.
   7. William V Gehrlein & Vincent Merlin, 2021. "On the Probability of the Ostrogorski Paradox," Post-Print halshs-03504780, HAL.
   8. Aaron Meyers & Michael Orrison & Jennifer Townsend & Sarah Wolff & Angela Wu, 2014. "Generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 11-27, June.

6. Gehrlein, W. & Valognes, F., 2000. "Condorcet Efficiency: A Preference for Indifference," Papers 224, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
   • Fabrice Valognes & William V. Gehrlein, 2001. "Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 193-205.

   Cited by:

   1. Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Post-Print halshs-00443854, HAL.
      • Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 289-316, August.
   2. Hervé Crès, 2001. "Aggregation of coarse preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 507-525.
      • Hervé, CRES, 1998. "Aggregation of Coarse Preferences," HEC Research Papers Series 659, HEC Paris.
      • Hervé Crès, 1998. "Aggregation of Coarse Preferences," Working Papers hal-00601582, HAL.
      • Hervé Crès, 2000. "Aggregation of Coarse Preferences," Working Papers hal-01064879, HAL.
   3. Erik Friese & William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Achill Schürmann, 2017. "The impact of dependence among voters’ preferences with partial indifference," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 51(6), pages 2793-2812, November.
      • Erik Friese & William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Achill Schürmann, 2016. "The Impact of Dependence among Voters’ Preferences with Partial Indifference," Post-Print hal-01450829, HAL.
   4. Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
   5. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2021. "Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin (ed.), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, pages 55-73, Springer.
      • Mostapha Diss & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui & Eric Kamwa, 2021. "Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention," Post-Print hal-02196387, HAL.
   6. Mathieu Martin, 2002. "On the emptiness of the stability set of order d," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 313-326, June.
      • M. Martin, 2001. "On the emptiness of the stability set of order d," THEMA Working Papers 2001-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
   7. Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004. "The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 343-361, November.
      • Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes, 2004. "The Impact of Indifferent Voters on the Likelihood of some Voting Paradoxes," Post-Print halshs-00069089, HAL.
   8. Ali Nasiri Khiavi & Mehdi Vafakhah & Seyed Hamidreza Sadeghi, 2022. "Comparative prioritization of sub-watersheds based on Flood Generation potential using physical, hydrological and co-managerial approaches," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 36(6), pages 1897-1917, April.
   9. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2014. "The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules," Post-Print hal-01450834, HAL.
      • William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2015. "The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 243-269, March.
   10. Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 299-320, October.
       • Eric Kamwa, 2019. "The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser," Post-Print hal-01786121, HAL.
   11. Lepelley, Dominique & Martin, Mathieu, 2001. "Condorcet's paradox for weak preference orderings," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 163-177, March.
   12. Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.

Articles

1. Samir Amine & Pedro Lages dos santos & Sylvain Baumann & Fabrice Valognes, 2009. "Revisiting Nash wages negotiations in matching models," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 3203-3213.

   Cited by:

   1. Claus-Jochen Haake & Thorsten Upmann & Papatya Duman, 2020. "Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining," CESifo Working Paper Series 8422, CESifo.
   2. Claus-Jochen Haake & Thorsten Upmann & Papatya Duman, 2019. "The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets," Working Papers CIE 128, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
   3. Samir Amine & Sylvain Baumann & Pedro Lages Dos Santos, 2018. "Bargaining Solutions and Public Policies in Matching Models," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 4, pages 3-14.
      • Sylvain Baumann & Samir Amine & Pedro Lages dos Santos, 2018. "Bargaining Solutions and Public Policies in Matching Models," Post-Print hal-02971764, HAL.
   4. Claus‐Jochen Haake & Thorsten Upmann & Papatya Duman, 2023. "Wage bargaining and employment revisited: separability and efficiency in collective bargaining," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 125(2), pages 403-440, April.

2. Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004. "The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 343-361, November.
   • Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes, 2004. "The Impact of Indifferent Voters on the Likelihood of some Voting Paradoxes," Post-Print halshs-00069089, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2019. "The Likelihood of the Consistency of Collective Rankings under Preferences Aggregation with Four Alternatives using Scoring Rules: A General Formula and the Optimal Decision Rule," Post-Print hal-01757742, HAL.
      • Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2019. "The Likelihood of the Consistency of Collective Rankings Under Preferences Aggregation with Four Alternatives Using Scoring Rules: A General Formula and the Optimal Decision Rule," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 53(4), pages 1377-1395, April.
   2. Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Post-Print halshs-00443854, HAL.
      • Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 289-316, August.
   3. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2021. "Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin (ed.), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, pages 55-73, Springer.
      • Mostapha Diss & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui & Eric Kamwa, 2021. "Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention," Post-Print hal-02196387, HAL.
   4. Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Post-Print hal-01702492, HAL.
      • Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2014. "Scoring Rules over Subsets of Alternatives: Consistency and Paradoxes," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201412, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
      • Kamwa, Eric & Merlin, Vincent, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 130-138.
   5. Katharina Holzinger & Andrea Schneider & Klaus Zimmermann, 2011. "Minimizing the losers: regime satisfaction in multi-level systems," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 303-324, December.
   6. Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 299-320, October.
      • Eric Kamwa, 2019. "The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser," Post-Print hal-01786121, HAL.
   7. Michael Ackerman & Sul-Young Choi & Peter Coughlin & Eric Gottlieb & Japheth Wood, 2013. "Elections with partially ordered preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 145-168, October.
   8. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2009. "Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(2), pages 317-333, February.

3. Lepelley, Dominique & Valognes, Fabrice, 2003. "Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 165-184, July.
   • Dominique Lepelley & Fabrice Valognes, 2003. "Voting rules manipulability and social homogeneity," Post-Print halshs-00069239, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. James Green-Armytage, 2014. "Strategic voting and nomination," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 111-138, January.
   2. James Green-Armytage, 2023. "A Dodgson-Hare synthesis," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 458-470, September.
   3. Lirong Xia, 2022. "The Impact of a Coalition: Assessing the Likelihood of Voter Influence in Large Elections," Papers 2202.06411, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
   4. Yuliya Veselova, 2016. "The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(3), pages 609-638, March.
      • Yuliya Veselova, 2012. "The difference between manipulability indexes in IC and IANC models," HSE Working papers WP BRP 17/EC/2012, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
   5. Mostapha Diss & Boris Tsvelikhovskiy, 2019. "Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules," Papers 1911.09173, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
      • Mostapha Diss & Boris Tsvelikhovskiy, 2020. "Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules," Working Papers 2020-08, CRESE.
      • Mostapha Diss & Boris Tsvelikhovskiy, 2024. "Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules," Working Papers hal-04543626, HAL.
      • Diss, Mostapha & Tsvelikhovskiy, Boris, 2021. "Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 11-18.
      • Mostapha Diss & Boris Tsvelikhovskiy, 2021. "Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules," Post-Print hal-04419927, HAL.
   6. Mostapha Diss, 2015. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 229(1), pages 347-376, June.
      • Mostapha Diss, 2013. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Working Papers 1302, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
      • Mostapha Diss, 2013. "Strategic manipulability of self-­selective social choice rules," Working Papers halshs-00785366, HAL.
      • Mostapha Diss, 2015. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Post-Print halshs-01136401, HAL.
   7. Burak Can & Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Ton Storcken, 2017. "Generalized Measures of Polarization in Preferences," Working Papers halshs-01597720, HAL.
      • Burak Can & Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Ton Storcken, 2017. "Generalized Measures of Polarization in Preferences," AMSE Working Papers 1734, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
   8. Eric Kamwa, 2019. "On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 519-541, June.
      • Eric Kamwa, 2019. "On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules," Post-Print hal-01786590, HAL.
   9. Eric Kamwa, 2022. "Scoring rules, ballot truncation, and the truncation paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 79-97, July.
      • Eric Kamwa, 2022. "Scoring Rules, Ballot Truncation, and the Truncation Paradox," Post-Print hal-03632662, HAL.
   10. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 73-90, October.
   11. Salvatore Barbaro, 2024. "Electoral Methods and Political Polarization," Working Papers 2411, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
   12. James Green-Armytage & T. Tideman & Rafael Cosman, 2016. "Statistical evaluation of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 183-212, January.
   13. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2020. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 523-548, June.
   14. Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006. "Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 485-509, June.
       • Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006. "Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules," Post-Print halshs-00068839, HAL.
   15. Jansen, C. & Schollmeyer, G. & Augustin, T., 2018. "A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 49-62.
   16. Karpov, Alexander, 2016. "Preference diversity orderings," Working Papers 0610, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
       • Alexander Karpov, 2017. "Preference Diversity Orderings," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 753-774, July.
   17. Eyal Baharad & Zvika Neeman, 2007. "Robustness against inefficient manipulation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(1), pages 55-67, July.
   18. Postl, Peter, 2017. "Évaluation et comparaison des règles de vote derrière le voile de l’ignorance : Tour d'horizon sélectif et analyse des règles de scores à deux paramètres," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 249-290, Mars-Juin.
   19. Geoffrey Pritchard & Arkadii Slinko, 2006. "On the Average Minimum Size of a Manipulating Coalition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(2), pages 263-277, October.
   20. James Green-Armytage & T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2020. "Selecting the runoff pair," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 119-137, January.
   21. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2016. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 152/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
   22. Karthik H. Shankar, 2022. "Normed Negative Voting to Depolarize Politics," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(6), pages 1097-1120, December.
   23. Marie-Louise Lackner & Martin Lackner, 2017. "On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 717-745, April.

4. Fabrice Valognes & Vincent Merlin & Monica Tataru, 2002. "On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(1), pages 193-206.
   • Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes & M. Tataru, 2002. "The likelihood of Condorcet's profiles," Post-Print halshs-00069518, HAL.
   • Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000. "On the Likelihood of Condorcet's Profiles," Papers 223, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
   See citations under working paper version above.
5. Fabrice Valognes & William V. Gehrlein, 2001. "Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 193-205.
   • Gehrlein, W. & Valognes, F., 2000. "Condorcet Efficiency: A Preference for Indifference," Papers 224, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
   See citations under working paper version above.
6. Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000. "On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 183-207, March.

   Cited by:

   1. Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2019. "The Likelihood of the Consistency of Collective Rankings under Preferences Aggregation with Four Alternatives using Scoring Rules: A General Formula and the Optimal Decision Rule," Post-Print hal-01757742, HAL.
      • Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2019. "The Likelihood of the Consistency of Collective Rankings Under Preferences Aggregation with Four Alternatives Using Scoring Rules: A General Formula and the Optimal Decision Rule," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 53(4), pages 1377-1395, April.
   2. Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Post-Print halshs-00443854, HAL.
      • Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 289-316, August.
   3. William Gehrlein, 1999. "On the Probability that all Weighted Scoring Rules Elect the Condorcet Winner," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 77-84, February.
   4. John C. McCabe-Dansted & Arkadii Slinko, 2006. "Exploratory Analysis of Similarities Between Social Choice Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 77-107, January.
   5. Takahiro Suzuki & Masahide Horita, 2023. "A Society Can Always Decide How to Decide: A Proof," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 32(5), pages 987-1023, October.
   6. Bonifacio Llamazares & Teresa Peña, 2015. "Positional Voting Systems Generated by Cumulative Standings Functions," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(5), pages 777-801, September.
   7. Chatterjee, Swarnendu & Storcken, Ton, 2020. "Frequency based analysis of collective aggregation rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 56-66.
   8. Michel Truchon, 2004. "Aggregation of Rankings in Figure Skating," Cahiers de recherche 0414, CIRPEE.
      • Truchon, Michel, 2004. "Aggregation of Rankings in Figure Skating," Cahiers de recherche 0402, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
   9. Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004. "The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 343-361, November.
      • Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes, 2004. "The Impact of Indifferent Voters on the Likelihood of some Voting Paradoxes," Post-Print halshs-00069089, HAL.
   10. William Gehrlein, 2006. "The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 191-208, January.
   11. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 699-725.
       • Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle," Post-Print hal-02147735, HAL.
   12. Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Post-Print hal-01702492, HAL.
       • Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2014. "Scoring Rules over Subsets of Alternatives: Consistency and Paradoxes," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201412, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
       • Kamwa, Eric & Merlin, Vincent, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 130-138.
   13. Raúl Pérez-Fernández & Bernard De Baets, 2019. "The superdominance relation, the positional winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(1), pages 46-65, January.
   14. William V. Gehrlein & Hemant V. Kher, 2004. "Decision Rules for the Academy Awards Versus Those for Elections," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 34(3), pages 226-234, June.
   15. McIntee, Tomas J. & Saari, Donald G., 2017. "Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 1-10.
   16. D. Marc Kilgour & Jean-Charles Grégoire & Angèle M. Foley, 2022. "Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 365-391, February.
   17. Saari, Donald G. & Valognes, Fabrice, 1999. "The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 429-456, December.
   18. Aaron Meyers & Michael Orrison & Jennifer Townsend & Sarah Wolff & Angela Wu, 2014. "Generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 11-27, June.
   19. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 2000. "The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 191-197, February.
   20. Chatterjee, Swarnendu & Storcken, Ton, 2017. "Frequency Based Analysis of Voting Rules," Research Memorandum 006, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
   21. Wilson, Mark C. & Pritchard, Geoffrey, 2007. "Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 244-256, December.
   22. Brian Kogelmann, 2017. "Aggregating out of indeterminacy," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 16(2), pages 210-232, May.

7. Saari, Donald G. & Valognes, Fabrice, 1999. "The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 429-456, December.

   Cited by:

   1. Bernardo Moreno & M. Socorro Puy, 2005. "The scoring rules in an endogenous election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(1), pages 115-125, October.
      • Bernardo Moreno & M. Socorro Puy, 2003. "The Scoring Rules in an Endogenous Election," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/26, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
   2. Baharad, Eyal & Danziger, Leif, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?," GLO Discussion Paper Series 185, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
   3. Ashley Piggins & Juan Perote-Pena, 2004. "Pareto Efficiency With Spatial Rights," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 87, Royal Economic Society.
      • Perote-Pena, Juan & Piggins, Ashley, 2005. "Pareto efficiency with spatial rights," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 265-283, April.
   4. Eric Kamwa, 2019. "On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 519-541, June.
      • Eric Kamwa, 2019. "On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules," Post-Print hal-01786590, HAL.
   5. Eyal Baharad & Leif Danziger, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which “Almost” Rule is Optimal?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 129-151, February.
   6. Andrew C. Eggers, 2021. "A diagram for analyzing ordinal voting systems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 143-171, January.
   7. Eric Kamwa & Fabrice Valognes, 2017. "Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited," Post-Print hal-01631180, HAL.
      • Eric Kamwa & Fabrice Valognes, 2017. "Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(3), pages 375-395.
   8. Eyal Baharad & Leif Danziger, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule is Optimal?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6851, CESifo.
   9. Baharad, Eyal & Danziger, Leif, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?," IZA Discussion Papers 11287, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   10. William Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2010. "On the probability of observing Borda’s paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(1), pages 1-23, June.
       • William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2009. "On the probability of observing Borda’s paradox," Post-Print hal-01243471, HAL.
   11. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2012. "Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 335-352, July.
       • Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Domains, Ranges and Strategy-Proofness: The Case of Single-dipped Preferences," Working Papers 418, Barcelona School of Economics.
       • Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Single-dipped preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 801.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-AFR: Africa (3) 2012-01-03 2013-01-26 2013-04-06
2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 2013-01-26 2013-04-06
3. NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (2) 2013-01-26 2013-04-06
4. NEP-RES: Resource Economics (2) 2013-01-26 2013-04-06
5. NEP-AGR: Agricultural Economics (1) 2012-01-03
6. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2011-09-22
7. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2011-09-22
8. NEP-IPR: Intellectual Property Rights (1) 2011-09-22
9. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2003-07-13
10. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2011-09-22

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