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A note on Condorcet's other paradox

Author

Listed:
  • William V. Gehrlein

    (University of Delaware [Newark])

  • Dominique Lepelley

    (CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion)

Abstract

We report in this note some results on the theoretical likelihood of Condorcet's Other Paradox in three alternative elections. This paradox occurs when we have a voting situation such that no Wheighted Scoring Rule (WSR) will select the Pairwise Majority Rule Winner as the WSR winner. We conclude from our study that actual observances of Condorcet's Other Paradox should be very rare events.

Suggested Citation

  • William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2009. "A note on Condorcet's other paradox," Post-Print hal-01243468, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243468
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2008. "On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 363-383, April.
    2. Fabrice Valognes & Vincent Merlin & Monica Tataru, 2002. "On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(1), pages 193-206.
    3. Fishburn, Peter C., 1974. "Paradoxes of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 537-546, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Majority rule; Probability; Revue AERES; Scoring rules; Social Choice; Voting paradoxes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

    Statistics

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