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Decision Rules for the Academy Awards Versus Those for Elections

Author

Listed:
  • William V. Gehrlein

    (Department of Business Administration, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19716-2710)

  • Hemant V. Kher

    (Department of Business Administration, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19716-2710)

Abstract

Many researchers have evaluated various decision rules to determine how well they perform in selecting winners in elections. They have established criteria to measure how well these rules perform in selecting winners with the greatest mass appeal in general elections. We evaluate such decision rules on their performance in determining winners of awards for outstanding accomplishment. We examined the procedures the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences uses to choose nominees and winners for Academy Awards. We chose this example for two reasons. First, the academy uses several decision rules to select nominees and to select the winners from the lists of final nominees. Second, Academy Awards have an enormous impact on earnings and careers. We found that decision rules that can have negative effects in elections based on mass appeal can have positive aspects in determining winners of awards for outstanding accomplishment.

Suggested Citation

  • William V. Gehrlein & Hemant V. Kher, 2004. "Decision Rules for the Academy Awards Versus Those for Elections," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 34(3), pages 226-234, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:orinte:v:34:y:2004:i:3:p:226-234
    DOI: 10.1287/inte.1040.0072
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Leye Li & Louise Yi Lu & Dongyue Wang, 2022. "External labour market competitions and stock price crash risk: evidence from exposures to competitor CEOs’ award‐winning events," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(S1), pages 1421-1460, April.
    2. Iain Pardoe & Dean K. Simonton, 2008. "Applying discrete choice models to predict Academy Award winners," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 171(2), pages 375-394, April.

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