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On the Probability that all Weighted Scoring Rules Elect the Condorcet Winner

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  • William Gehrlein

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  • William Gehrlein, 1999. "On the Probability that all Weighted Scoring Rules Elect the Condorcet Winner," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 77-84, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:33:y:1999:i:1:p:77-84
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1004309803136
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. William V. Gehrlein, 1998. "The sensitivity of weight selection on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 351-358.
    2. William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1983. "Scoring rule sensitivity to weight selection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 249-261, January.
    3. William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1981. "Constant scoring rules for choosing one among many alternatives," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 203-210, April.
    4. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 1999. "Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(3), pages 471-490.
    5. Gehrlein, William V., 1982. "Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 123-130, March.
    6. Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000. "On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 183-207, March.
    7. Williams Gehrlein, 1993. "Condorcet efficiency of two stage constant scoring rules," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 95-101, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 699-725.
    2. Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000. "On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 183-207, March.
    3. Aaron Meyers & Michael Orrison & Jennifer Townsend & Sarah Wolff & Angela Wu, 2014. "Generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 11-27, June.
    4. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2019. "On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle," Working Papers hal-02147735, HAL.
    5. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 2000. "The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 191-197, February.

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    Keywords

    Condorcet winner; weighted scoring rules;

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