IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pta622.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Ina Taneva

Personal Details

First Name:Ina
Middle Name:
Last Name:Taneva
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pta622
http://sites.google.com/site/itaneva13/home

Affiliation

School of Economics
University of Edinburgh

Edinburgh, United Kingdom
http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/
RePEc:edi:deediuk (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Mathevet, Laurent & Taneva, Ina, 2022. "Organized Information Transmission," CEPR Discussion Papers 16959, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Taneva, Ina & Wiseman, Thomas, 2022. "Strategic Ignorance and Information Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 16892, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Ina A Taneva, 2015. "Information Design," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 256, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.

Articles

  1. Laurent Mathevet & Jacopo Perego & Ina Taneva, 2020. "On Information Design in Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(4), pages 1370-1404.
  2. Ina Taneva, 2019. "Information Design," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 151-185, November.
  3. Mathevet, Laurent & Taneva, Ina, 2013. "Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 327-349.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Mathevet, Laurent & Taneva, Ina, 2022. "Organized Information Transmission," CEPR Discussion Papers 16959, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Li, Fei & Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2023. "Global manipulation by local obfuscation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    2. Hiroto Sato, 2023. "Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 269-285, June.

  2. Ina A Taneva, 2015. "Information Design," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 256, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.

    Cited by:

    1. Ozan Candogan & Kimon Drakopoulos, 2020. "Optimal Signaling of Content Accuracy: Engagement vs. Misinformation," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 497-515, March.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 586-591, May.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Working Papers 089_2017, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games," Working Papers 054-2013, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    5. Jonas Hedlund & Allan Hernández-Chanto & Carlos Oyarzún, 2021. "Contagion Management through Information Disclosure," Discussion Papers Series 651, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    6. Sareh Vosooghi, 2017. "Information Design In Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers 2017.28, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    7. Goldstein, Itay & Leitner, Yaron, 2018. "Stress tests and information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 34-69.
    8. Redlicki, B., 2017. "Spreading Lies," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1747, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    9. Makoto Shimoji, 2016. "Rationalizable Persuasion," Discussion Papers 16/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
    10. Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2021. "The Good, the Bad and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21155, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    11. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Discussion Papers 2020/3, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    12. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2017. "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1949-1964, November.
    13. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Omer Tamuz, 2020. "Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs," Papers 2002.11362, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
    14. Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy, 2019. "Persuasion on Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 13723, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas, 2018. "Noisy Persuasion," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 11-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    16. Carl Heese & Stephan Lauermann, 2021. "Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 112, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    17. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2016. "Persuading Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3590-3605, November.
    18. Kevin He & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Omer Tamuz, 2021. "Private Private Information," Papers 2112.14356, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    19. Asriyan, Vladimir & Foarta, Dana & Vanasco, Victoria, 2018. "Strategic Complexity When Seeking Approval," Research Papers 3615, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    20. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
    21. Negrelli, Sara, 2020. "Bubbles and persuasion with uncertainty over market sentiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 67-85.
    22. Alex Smolin & Takuro Yamashita, 2022. "Information Design in Smooth Games," Papers 2202.10883, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    23. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1909, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    24. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
      • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    25. Christoph SchottmÑŒller, 2019. "Welfare optimal information structures in bilateral trade," Working Paper Series in Economics 98, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    26. Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2019. "Persuasion with limited communication capacity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    27. Raphaela Hennigs, 2021. "Conflict prevention by Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(4), pages 710-731, August.
    28. Cédric Wanko, 2018. "A Unique and Stable $$\hbox {Se}{\mathcal {C}}\hbox {ure}$$ Se C ure Reversion Protocol Improving Efficiency: A Computational Bayesian Approach for Empirical Analysis," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 52(1), pages 1-23, June.
    29. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2021. "Persuasion with costly precision," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 869-908, October.
    30. Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2020. "Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    31. Kerman, Toygar & Tenev, Anastas P., 2021. "Persuading communicating voters," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    32. Kerman, Toygar & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Karos, Dominik, 2020. "Persuading Strategic Voters," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    33. Junze Sun & Arthur Schram & Randolph Sloof, 2019. "A Theory on Media Bias and Elections," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-048/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    34. Raphaela Hennigs, 2019. "Conflict Prevention by Bayesian Persuasion," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2019-16_1, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    35. Yun Wang, 2015. "Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers," Working Papers 2015-03-24, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    36. David Lingenbrink & Krishnamurthy Iyer, 2019. "Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 1397-1416, September.
    37. Takashi Ui, 2020. "LQG Information Design," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 018, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
    38. Aristidou, Andreas & Coricelli, Giorgio & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2019. "Incentives or Persuasion? An Experimental Investigation," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

Articles

  1. Laurent Mathevet & Jacopo Perego & Ina Taneva, 2020. "On Information Design in Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(4), pages 1370-1404.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Working Papers 089_2017, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    2. Roweno J. R. K. Heijmans, 2023. "Unraveling Coordination Problems," Papers 2307.08557, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    3. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2018. "Interactive Information Design," Working Papers hal-01933896, HAL.
    4. Li, Fei & Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2023. "Global manipulation by local obfuscation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    5. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Dominik Karos & Toygar T. Kerman, 2024. "Belief inducibility and informativeness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(4), pages 517-553, June.
    6. Frederic Koessler & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games," Papers 2107.06312, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    7. Jonas Hedlund & Allan Hernández-Chanto & Carlos Oyarzún, 2021. "Contagion Management through Information Disclosure," Discussion Papers Series 651, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    8. Rivera Mora, Ernesto, 2024. "Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    9. Goldstein, Itay & Leitner, Yaron, 2018. "Stress tests and information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 34-69.
    10. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    11. Chen, Yi-Chun & Yang, Xiangqian, 2023. "Information design in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    12. Koessler, Frédéric & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2022. "Informed Information Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 17028, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Skreta, Vasiliki & Koessler, Frédéric, 2021. "Information Design by an Informed Designer," CEPR Discussion Papers 15709, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Carl Heese & Stephan Lauermann, 2021. "Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 112, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    15. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2023. "Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions," Papers 2307.07672, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
    16. Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin, 2022. "Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 226-248.
    17. Kevin He & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Omer Tamuz, 2021. "Private Private Information," Papers 2112.14356, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    18. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
      • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    19. Masaki Miyashita & Takashi Ui, 2023. "LQG Information Design," Papers 2312.09479, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    20. Inostroza, Nicolas A. & Pavan, Alessandro, 0. "Adversarial coordination and public information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    21. Bardhi, Arjada & Guo, Yingni, 2018. "Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), September.
    22. Toygar T. Kerman & Anastas P. Tenev, 2024. "Pitfalls of Information Spillovers in Persuasion," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp772, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    23. Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2021. "Optimal information exchange in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    24. Feng, Xin, 2020. "Information disclosure on the contest mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 148-156.
    25. Hiroto Sato, 2023. "Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 269-285, June.
    26. Takashi Ui, 2020. "LQG Information Design," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 018, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.

  2. Ina Taneva, 2019. "Information Design," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 151-185, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Mathevet, Laurent & Taneva, Ina, 2013. "Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 327-349.

    Cited by:

    1. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2021. "A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: The Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions," Working Papers 1248, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Mariann Ollar & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Implementation via Transfers with Identical but Unknown Distributions," Working Papers 1126, Barcelona School of Economics.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2015-07-25 2021-01-25
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2015-07-25 2021-01-25
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2015-07-25
  4. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2021-01-25
  5. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2021-01-25
  6. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2015-07-25

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Ina Taneva should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.