Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
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Cited by:
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- Dino Gerardi & Edoardo Grillo & Ignacio Monzón, 2022. "The Perils of Friendly Oversight," Working Papers 122, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Yingkai Li & Boli Xu, 2024. "Falsifiable Test Design in Coordination Games," Papers 2405.18521, arXiv.org.
- Li, Fei & Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2023. "Global manipulation by local obfuscation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
- Philipp Denter & Martin Dumav & Boris Ginzburg, 2021.
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- Denter, Philipp & Dumav, Martin & Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "Social Connectivity, Media Bias, and Correlation Neglect," MPRA Paper 97626, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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- Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov, 2019. "Private Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 185-217.
- , & Frechette, Guilaume & Perego, Jacopo, 2019. "Rules and Commitment in Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 14085, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carl Heese & Stephan Lauermann, 2021. "Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 112, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Toygar T. Kerman & P. Jean‐Jacques Herings & Dominik Karos, 2024. "Persuading sincere and strategic voters," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(1), February.
- Jacqueline Sanchez-Rabaza & Jose Maria Rocha-Martinez & Julio B. Clempner, 2023. "Characterizing Manipulation via Machiavellianism," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(19), pages 1-19, September.
- Toygar T. Kerman & Anastas P. Tenev, 2024. "Pitfalls of Information Spillovers in Persuasion," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp772, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Kerman, Toygar & Tenev, Anastas P., 2021. "Persuading communicating voters," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
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"Optimal information censorship,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 377-385.
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- Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023. "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 743-780, April.
- Kun Heo & Antoine Zerbini, 2024. "Segment and rule: Modern censorship in authoritarian regimes," Discussion Papers 2024-04, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
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"Voting with public information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 694-719.
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- Alonso, Ricardo & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2024. "Persuading large investors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 126040, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Jeong, Daeyoung, 2019. "Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 50-80.
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- Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019.
"Pivotal persuasion,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
- Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
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More about this item
Keywords
Information design; collective decision-making; unanimity rule; information guard;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
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