Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109615
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More about this item
Keywords
Verifiable information disclosure; No commitment; Cournot competition;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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