Venkatraman Sadanand

Personal Details

First Name:	Venkatraman
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Sadanand
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	psa440
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Loma Linda University

http://www.llu.edu
Loma Linda, California, USA

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

Sorry, no citations of working papers recorded.

Articles

1. Bossert, Walter & Nosal, Ed & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1996. "Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 173-189, June.

   Cited by:

   1. Peters, H.J.M. & Bossert, W. & Derks, J., 2001. "Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games," Research Memorandum 008, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
      • Bossert, Walter & Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans, 2005. "Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 12-23, July.
      • BOSSERT, Walter & DERKS, Jean & PETERS, Hans, 2001. "Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games," Cahiers de recherche 2001-14, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
      • Bossert, W. & Derks, J. & Peters, H., 2001. "Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games," Cahiers de recherche 2001-14, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
   2. Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, 1998. "Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty," Discussion Papers 98/8, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
      • Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2001. "Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-10, January.
   3. Taiji Furusawa & Quan Wen, 2001. "Unique Inneficient Perfect Equilibrium in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining with Complete Information," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0121, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
   4. Christopher P. Chambers & Alan D. Miller, 2014. "Inefficiency Measurement," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 79-92, May.
   5. Singer, Marcos & Donoso, Patricio & Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos, 2008. "A static model of cooperation for group-based incentive plans," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 492-501, October.
   6. Amparo M. Mármol Conde & Clara Ponsatí Obiols, 2006. "Bargaining Multiple Issues with Leximin Preferences," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2006/05, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
   7. Balakrishnan, P.V. (Sundar) & Gómez, Juan Camilo & Vohra, Rakesh V., 2011. "The Tempered Aspirations solution for bargaining problems with a reference point," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 144-150.
   8. L. Monroy & V. Rubiales & A. M. Mármol, 2017. "The conservative Kalai–Smorodinsky solution for multiple scenario bargaining," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 251(1), pages 285-299, April.

2. Sadanand, Asha & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1996. "Firm Scale and the Endogenous Timing of Entry: a Choice between Commitment and Flexibility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 516-530, August.

   Cited by:

   1. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1999. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 105-129, July.
      • van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1996. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Discussion Paper 1996-115, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
      • Eric van Damme & Sjaak Hurkens, 1996. "Endogenous Stackelberg leadership," Economics Working Papers 190, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
      • van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1996. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Other publications TiSEM 69b18274-5c68-4723-a5e9-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   2. Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Ramon Faulí-Oller, 2008. "Mergers in asymmetric Stackelberg markets," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 279-288, December.
      • Marc Escrihuela Villar & Ramon Fauli Oller, 2007. "Mergers in Asymmetric Stackelberg Markets," Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers EC200701, Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance.
      • Ramón Faulí-Oller & Marc Escrihuela, 2007. "Mergers In Asymmetric Stackelberg Markets," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
   3. Güth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2004. "On the Nash Bargaining Solution with noise," Other publications TiSEM 2def5ecc-d422-4c00-b049-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Güth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise," Discussion Paper 2002-79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
      • Guth, Werner & Ritzberger, Klaus & van Damme, Eric, 2004. "On the Nash bargaining solution with noise," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 697-713, June.
      • Güth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise," Other publications TiSEM cd5dddf5-811b-4c0c-97d6-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   4. Güth, Sandra & Güth, Werner, 1998. "Preemption in capacity and price determination: A study of endogenous timing of decisions for homogeneous markets," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1998,100, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
      • Sandra Güth & Werner Güth, 2000. "Preemption in Capacity and Price Determination - A Study of Endogenous Timing of Decisions for Homogeneous Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 309, CESifo.
   5. Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2004. "Short-run policy commitment when investment timing is endogenous: "More harm than good?"," Economics Department Working Paper Series n1400904, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
      • Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2011. "Short‐Run Policy Commitment When Investment Timing Is Endogenous: ‘More Harm Than Good?’," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 82-107, January.
   6. BOYER, Marcel & MOREAUX, Michel, 1995. "Capacity Commitment Versus Flexibility: The Technological Choice Nexus in a Strategic Context," Cahiers de recherche 9556, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
      • Marcel Boyer & Michel Moreaux, 1995. "Capacity Commitment Versus Flexibility: The Technological Choice Nexus in a Strategic Context," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-35, CIRANO.
   7. Blázquez, Mario & Koptyug, Nikita, 2022. "Equilibrium Selection in Hawk-Dove Games," Discussion Papers 2022/12, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
   8. Gürtler, Marc & Sieg, Gernot, 2006. "Crunch time: The optimal policy to avoid the "Announcement Effect" when terminating a subsidy," Working Papers FW24V2, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Institute of Finance.
      • Gürtler, Marc & Sieg, Gernot, 2008. "Crunch time: A policy to avoid the announcement effect when terminating a subsidy," Economics Department Working Paper Series 1, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department.
   9. Christophe Caron & Thierry Lafay, 2008. "How Risk Disciplines Pre-commitment," Post-Print hal-00825882, HAL.
      • Christophe Caron & Thierry Lafay, 2008. "How Risk Disciplines Pre-Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 205-226, November.
   10. Siegfried K. Berninghaus & Werner Güth, 2002. "NOW OR LATER? - An Analysis of the Timing of Threats in Bargaining," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-38, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
   11. Güth, Werner, 2000. "Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2000,82, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
   12. Oksana Loginova & X. Hnery Wang, 2010. "Customization in an Endogenous-Timing Game with Vertical Differentiation," Working Papers 1008, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
       • Oksana Loginova & X. Hnery Wang, 2013. "Customization in an Endogenous-Timing Game with Vertical Differentiation," Working Papers 1304, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
   13. Marc Gürtler & Gernot Sieg, 2010. "Crunch Time: A Policy to Avoid the ‘Announcement Effect’ when Terminating a Subsidy," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(1), pages 25-36, February.
       • Gürtler, Marc & Sieg, Gernot, 2008. "Crunch time: A policy to avoid the announcement effect when terminating a subsidy," Economics Department Working Paper Series 1, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department.
       • Gürtler Marc & Sieg Gernot, 2010. "Crunch Time: A Policy to Avoid the ‘Announcement Effect’ when Terminating a Subsidy," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 25-36, February.
   14. Werner Güth, "undated". "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-48, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
       • Werner Güth, 2002. "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 371-392, December.
   15. Zemsky, Peter & Pacheco de Almeida, Goncalo, 2002. "Time-to-Build and Strategic Investment Under Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 3674, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   16. Jianhu Zhang & Changying Li, 2013. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly under demand uncertainty," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 108(3), pages 273-289, April.
   17. Güth, Werner, 1998. "Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1998,5, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
   18. Solan, Eilon & Yariv, Leeat, 2004. "Games with espionage," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 172-199, April.
       • Eilon Solan & Leeat Yariv, 1998. "Games with Espionage," Discussion Papers 1257, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   19. Loginova, Oksana & Wang, X. Henry, 2013. "Mass customization in an endogenous-timing game with vertical differentiation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 164-173.
   20. Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Magnus HOFFMANN, 2010. "Endogenous timing game with non-monotonic reaction functions," Working Papers 201017, CERDI.
       • Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Magnus Hoffmann, 2011. "Endogenous timing game with non-monotonic reaction functions," Working Papers halshs-00553130, HAL.
   21. Enrico Pennings, 2004. "Optimal Pricing And Quality Choice When Investment In Quality Is Irreversible," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 569-589, December.
       • Enrico Pennings, "undated". "Optimal pricing and quality choice when investment in quality is irreversible," Working Papers 206, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
   22. Attila Tasnádi, 2009. "Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2009_25, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
       • Attila Tasnádi, 2010. "Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 99(3), pages 251-266, April.
       • Tasnádi, Attila, 2009. "Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm," MPRA Paper 13612, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   23. Tasnadi, Attila, 2000. "A price-setting game with a nonatomic fringe," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 63-69, October.
   24. Tamini, Lota D., 2012. "Optimal quality choice under uncertainty on market development," MPRA Paper 40845, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   25. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 2000. "Flexibilité et stratégies d’impartition," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 76(2), pages 199-224, juin.
   26. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1996. "Capacity Commitment versus Flexibility," IDEI Working Papers 63, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
       • Marcel Boyer & Michel Moreaux, 1997. "Capacity Commitment versus Flexibility," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 347-376, June.
   27. Nakamura, Yasuhiko, 2019. "Combining the endogenous choice of the timing of setting incentive parameters and the contents of strategic contracts in a managerial mixed duopoly," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 207-233.
   28. Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2002. "Time-to-build investment and uncertainty in oligopoly," Working Papers 200207, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
   29. Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Magnus Hoffmann, 2011. "Endogenous timing game with non-monotonic reaction functions," CERDI Working papers halshs-00553130, HAL.
       • Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Magnus Hoffmann, 2011. "Endogenous timing game with non-monotonic reaction functions," Working Papers halshs-00553130, HAL.
   30. Tamini, Lota Dabio, 2012. "Optimal quality choice under uncertainty on market development," Working Papers 148589, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA).
   31. Tohru Wako & Hiroshi Ohta, 2015. "Bowley Duopoly Under Vertical Relations," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 778-790, December.
   32. Magnus Hoffmann & Grégoire Rota‐Graziosi, 2020. "Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 359-402, February.
       • Magnus Hoffmann & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2020. "Endogenous Timing in the Presence of Non-Monotonicities," Post-Print hal-02056492, HAL.
   33. Dewit, Gerda & Leahy, Dermot, 2006. "Investment timing under uncertainty in oligopoly: Symmetry or leadership?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-19.
   34. Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2001. "Fighting over Uncertain Demand: Investment Commitment versus Flexibility," Economics Department Working Paper Series n1060201, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
   35. Tesoriere, Antonio, 2008. "Endogenous R&D symmetry in linear duopoly with one-way spillovers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 213-225, May.
   36. Barla, Philippe & Constantatos, Christos, 2005. "Strategic interactions and airline network morphology under demand uncertainty," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 703-716, April.
   37. Cong Pan, 2015. "Should Brand Firms Always Take Pioneering Position?," ISER Discussion Paper 0938, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
   38. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2020. "Endogenously choosing the timing of setting strategic contracts’ levels and content in a managerial mixed duopoly with welfare-based and sales delegation contracts," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 67(3), pages 363-402, September.
   39. Chia-Hung Sun, 2020. "Simultaneous and sequential choice in a symmetric two-player game with canyon-shaped payoffs," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 191-219, April.
   40. Cong Pan, 2018. "Firms’ timing of production with heterogeneous consumers," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(4), pages 1339-1362, November.
   41. Rodolphe Durand & Robert M. Grant & Tammy L. Madsen & Lenos Trigeorgis & Jeffrey J. Reuer, 2017. "Real options theory in strategic management," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 42-63, January.
   42. Sebastien Mitraille & Henry Thille, 2017. "Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment," Working Papers 1708, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
       • Sébastien Mitraille & Henry Thille, 2020. "Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 789-828, April.
   43. Kuang-Cheng Andy Wang & Yi-Jie Wang & Wen-Jung Liang, 2016. "Intellectual property rights, international licensing and foreign direct investment," Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(3), pages 291-305, July.
   44. Midori Hirokawa & Dan Sasaki, 2001. "Endogenously Asynchronous Entries into an Uncertain Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(3), pages 435-461, September.
   45. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2019. "Endogenous Choice of the Timing of Setting Incentive Parameters and the Strategic Contracts in a Managerial Mixed Duopoly with a Welfare-Based Delegation Contract and a Sales Delegation Contract," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 679-737, December.
   46. Orlando I. Balboa & Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2001. "Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0112, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Dec 2002.
       • Orlando I. Balboa & Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2004. "Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 125-150, March.
   47. Hans Haanappel & Han Smit, 2007. "Return distributions of strategic growth options," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 57-80, April.
   48. Sun, Chia-Hung, 2013. "Combining the endogenous choice of price/quantity and timing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 364-368.
   49. Marc Escrihuela-Villar, 2019. "On Mergers in a Stackelberg Market with Asymmetric Convex Costs," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 21-32, March.

3. Sadanand, Asha B & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1995. "Equilibria in Non-cooperative Games II: Deviations Based Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 93-113, April.
   • Sadanand, A. & Sadanand, V., 1992. "Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Game II: Deviations Based Refinements of N ash Equilibrium," Working Papers 1992-10, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.

   Cited by:

   1. Hammond, Peter J., 2008. "Beyond Normal Form Invariance : First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 835, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
      • Hammond, Peter J., 2008. "Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk," Economic Research Papers 269784, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
      • Peter J. Hammond, 2008. "Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Koichi Tadenuma & Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara (ed.), Rational Choice and Social Welfare, pages 215-233, Springer.
   2. Asha Sadanand, 2019. "Ideal Reactive Equilibrium," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-18, April.

4. Sadanand, Asha B & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1994. "Equilibria in Non-cooperative Games I: Perturbations Based Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 197-224, July.
   • Sadanand, A. & Sadanand, V., 1992. "Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Game I: Perturbations Based Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Working Papers 1992-09, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.

   Cited by:

   1. Asha Sadanand, 2019. "Ideal Reactive Equilibrium," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-18, April.

5. Amershi Amin H. & Sadanand Asha & Sadanand Venkatraman, 1992. "Player importance and forward induction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 291-297, March.

   Cited by:

   1. Antonio Penta & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2019. "Rationalizability, observability and common knowledge," Economics Working Papers 1662, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
      • Antonio Penta & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2022. "Rationalizability, Observability, and Common Knowledge," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(2), pages 948-975.
      • Antonio Penta & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2019. "Rationalizability, Observability and Common Knowledge," Working Papers 1106, Barcelona School of Economics.
   2. Hammond, Peter J., 2008. "Beyond Normal Form Invariance : First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 835, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
      • Hammond, Peter J., 2008. "Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk," Economic Research Papers 269784, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
      • Peter J. Hammond, 2008. "Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Koichi Tadenuma & Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara (ed.), Rational Choice and Social Welfare, pages 215-233, Springer.
   3. R. Muller & Asha Sadanand, 2003. "Order of Play, Forward Induction, and Presentation Effects in Two-Person Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(1), pages 5-25, June.
   4. Caminati, Mauro & Innocenti, Alessandro & Ricciuti, Roberto, 2006. "Drift effect under timing without observability: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 393-414, November.
   5. Ayala Arad & Benjamin Bachi & Amnon Maltz, 2023. "On the relevance of irrelevant strategies," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(5), pages 1142-1184, November.
   6. Alessandro Innocenti & Mauro Caminati & Roberto Ricciuti, 2003. "Drift effect and timing without observability: experimental evidence," Department of Economics University of Siena 405, Department of Economics, University of Siena.

6. Asha Sadanand & Venkatraman Sadanand & Denton Marks, 1989. "Probationary Contracts in Agencies with Bilateral Asymmetric Information," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(3), pages 643-661, August.

   Cited by:

   1. Glazer, Amihai, 2012. "Up-or-out policies when a worker imitates another," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 432-438.
   2. H. Sami, 2006. "Random monitoring in financing relationships," Post-Print hal-00260915, HAL.
      • H. Sami, 2006. "Random monitoring in financing relationships," Post-Print hal-00260908, HAL.
      • Hind Sami, 2009. "Random monitoring in financing relationships," Post-Print halshs-00522629, HAL.
      • H. Sami, 2006. "Random monitoring in financing relationships," Post-Print hal-00260909, HAL.
      • Sami, Hind, 2009. "Random monitoring in financing relationships," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 239-252, May.
      • H. Sami, 2009. "Random monitoring in financing relationships," Post-Print hal-00325260, HAL.
   3. Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004. "How Often Should you Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents," CEPR Discussion Papers 4255, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2008. "How often should you open the door?: Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 820-831, September.
      • Gerd Muehlheusser & Andrea Ichino, 2004. "How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 60, Econometric Society.
      • Andrea Ichino & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2003. "How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Diskussionsschriften dp0319, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
      • Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004. "How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents," IZA Discussion Papers 987, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   4. Riphahn Regina T. & Thalmaier Anja, 2001. "Behavioral Effects of Probation Periods: An Analysis of Worker Absenteeism / Anreizeffekte der Probezeit: Eine Untersuchung von Fehlzeiten bei Arbeitnehmern," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 221(2), pages 179-201, April.
   5. Panu Poutvaara & Tuomas Takalo & Andreas Wagener, 2017. "The Optimal Duration of Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 6808, CESifo.
   6. Riphahn, Regina T. & Thalmaier, Anja, 1999. "Behavioral Effects of Probation Periods: An Analysis of Worker Absenteeism," IZA Discussion Papers 67, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   7. Fredrik Andersson, 2001. "Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 173-195, June.

7. Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1989. "Endogenous diffusion of technology," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 471-487, December.

   Cited by:

   1. David Goldbaum, 2016. "Conformity and Influence," Working Paper Series 35, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
      • Goldbaum David, 2019. "Conformity and Influence," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-29, January.
   2. Jie Li & Ramkishen Rajan, 2009. "Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer Under Uncertainty in a Liberalizing Host Economy," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 23-41.
   3. AJ Bostian & David Goldbaum, 2016. "Emergent Coordination among Competitors," Working Paper Series 36, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.

8. Sadanand, V., 1988. "Endogenously determined price-setting monopoly in an exchange economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 172-178, October.

   Cited by:

   1. Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato & Sayantan Ghosal & Damiano Turchet, 2023. "On the foundation of monopoly in bilateral exchange," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1261-1290, December.
      • Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato & Sayantan Ghosal & Damiano Turchet, 2021. "On the Foundation of Monopoly in Bilateral Exchange," Working Papers 2021_04, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
   2. Orlando I. Balboa & Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2001. "Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0112, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Dec 2002.
      • Orlando I. Balboa & Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2004. "Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 125-150, March.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Venkatraman Sadanand should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.