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Endogenous timing in a mixed triopoly with state-owned, labour-managed and capitalist firms

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  • Ohnishi, Kazuhiro

Abstract

Over the past approximately 30 years, many researchers have examined oligopoly models where firms endogenously select the timing of their action decisions. Therefore, this paper studies a mixed triopoly model featuring competition between a labour-managed firm, a capitalist firm and a state-owned firm. The sequence of events is as follows. In stage 0, each firm independently and simultaneously selects either ‘stage 1’ or ‘stage 2’. In this context, stage 1 denotes that a firm produces in stage 1, whereas stage 2 signifies that it produces in stage 2. In stage 1, if a firm opts for stage 1, it determines its output for this stage. In stage 2, if a firm chooses stage 2, it decides on its output for this stage. Upon the conclusion of the game, the market opens, and all firms sell their outputs. The purpose of this paper is to present the equilibrium outcome of triopoly competition where a state-owned firm, a labour-managed firm and a capitalist firm compete in quantities. As a result of the analysis, this paper reveals that there exists an equilibrium wherein both the labour-managed firm and the capitalist firm assume leadership roles. The paper finds that the state-owned firm is precluded from functioning as the Stackelberg leader.

Suggested Citation

  • Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2024. "Endogenous timing in a mixed triopoly with state-owned, labour-managed and capitalist firms," MPRA Paper 123007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:123007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capitalist firm; Cournot game; Endogenous timing; Labour-managed firm; State-owned firm;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General

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