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Optimal pricing and quality choice when investment in quality is irreversible

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  • Enrico Pennings

Abstract

This paper examines the price and quality choice by a single product risk-neutral monopolist who can delay irreversible investments required for market entry. It is shown that the price and quality she chooses at entry increase with uncertainty about the size of future demand. As opposed to a myopic monopolist she provides a quality that is socially optimal, but the moment at which she invests will be later than socially optimal. In a Stackelberg leader-follower game the leader pre-commits immediately regardless of the level of market uncertainty and may opt for the lower quality good rather than the higher quality good when market uncertainty is high.

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  • Enrico Pennings, "undated". "Optimal pricing and quality choice when investment in quality is irreversible," Working Papers 206, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:206
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    3. Huisman, K.J.M. & Kort, P.M. & Pawlina, G. & Thijssen, J.J.J., 2003. "Strategic Investment Under Uncertainty : Merging Real Options with Game Theory," Discussion Paper 2003-6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Tamini, Lota Dabio, 2012. "Optimal quality choice under uncertainty on market development," Working Papers 148589, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA).
    5. Grzegorz Pawlina & Peter M. Kort, 2010. "Strategic Quality Choice Under Uncertainty: A Real Options Approach," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 78(1), pages 1-19, January.
    6. Kamoto, Shinsuke, 2023. "Investment decisions and financial leverage under a potential entry threat," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    7. Chevalier-Roignant, Benoît & Flath, Christoph M. & Huchzermeier, Arnd & Trigeorgis, Lenos, 2011. "Strategic investment under uncertainty: A synthesis," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(3), pages 639-650, December.
    8. Asano, Takao & Shibata, Akihisa, 2011. "Optimal pricing and quality choice of a monopolist under Knightian uncertainty," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 746-754.
    9. Li, Shuai & Cai, Jiannan & Feng, Zhuo & Xu, Yifang & Cai, Hubo, 2019. "Government contracting with monopoly in infrastructure provision: Regulation or deregulation?," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 506-523.
    10. Vincenzo Atella & Jay Bhattacharya & Lorenzo Carbonari, 2008. "Pharmaceutical industry, drug quality and regulation. Evidence from US and Italy," CEIS Research Paper 138, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 16 Dec 2008.
    11. Emanuele Bacchiega, 2007. "Wage bargaining and vertical differentiation," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 54(1), pages 35-52, March.
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    14. Kamoto, Shinsuke, 2015. "Strategic capacity expansion under a potential entry threat," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 157-177.

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