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Shiran Rachmilevitch

Personal Details

First Name:Shiran
Middle Name:
Last Name:Rachmilevitch
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pra923
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/profshiranrachmilevitch/

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Haifa

Haifa, Israel
http://hevra.haifa.ac.il/econ/
RePEc:edi:dehaiil (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Kotowski, Maciej Henryk & Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Bribing in First-Price Auctions: Corrigendum," Scholarly Articles 10591649, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
  2. Peled, Dan & Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2012. "Infinite horizon allocation with consumption-dependent utility," Working Papers WP2012/9, University of Haifa, Department of Economics, revised 18 Oct 2012.
  3. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Bribing in second-price auctions," Working Papers WP2011/7, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
  4. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Gradual Negotiations and Proportional Solutions," Working Papers WP2011/8, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
  5. Miller, Alan D. & Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "A Behavioral Arrow Theorem," Working Papers WP2012/7, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
  6. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "The Nash Bargaining Solution and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Working Papers WP2012/1, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
  7. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Endogenous Bid Rotation in Repeated Auctions," Working Papers WP2011/9, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
  8. Shiran Rachmilevitch, "undated". "Punishing greediness in Divide-the-dollar games," Working Papers WP2016/4, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
  9. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Fairness, Efficiency, and the Nash Bargaining Solution," Working Papers WP2011/10, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
  10. Shiran Rachmilevitch, "undated". "Repeated bargaining," Working Papers WP2017/5, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
  11. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Fairness in Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution," Working Papers WP2011/12, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2017. "Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(3), pages 341-351, March.
  2. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2017. "Axiomatizations of the equal-loss and weighted equal-loss bargaining solutions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(1), pages 1-9, June.
  3. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2016. "Weighted randomized dictatorship and the asymmetric Nash solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 1-4.
  4. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2016. "Social objectives in general equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 99-102.
  5. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2016. "Approximate equilibria in strongly symmetric games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 52-57.
  6. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2015. "A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(2), pages 167-171, June.
  7. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2015. "The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(3), pages 463-478, November.
  8. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015. "Bribing in second-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 191-205.
  9. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015. "Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 107-109.
  10. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2014. "First-best collusion without communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 224-230.
  11. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2014. "Randomized dictatorship and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(2), pages 173-177, February.
  12. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1714-1725.
  13. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Cooperative bargaining: Independence and monotonicity imply disagreement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 240-242.
  14. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Bribing in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 214-228.
  15. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2011. "Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 63-85, February.
  16. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2011. "A characterization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution by disagreement point monotonicity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(4), pages 691-696, November.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Kotowski, Maciej Henryk & Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Bribing in First-Price Auctions: Corrigendum," Scholarly Articles 10591649, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.

    Cited by:

    1. Hinloopen, Jeroen & Onderstal, Sander & Treuren, Leonard, 2020. "Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    2. Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro’i Zultan, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms And Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals And Selection," Working Papers 1406, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    3. Serhat Dogan & Emin Karagözoglu & Kerim Keskin & Cagri Saglam, 2020. "Bribing in Team Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 8096, CESifo.
    4. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    5. Troyan, Peter, 2017. "Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 319-345.
    6. Olga Gorelkina, 2014. "Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    7. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    8. Zheng, Charles Z., 2019. "Bidding collusion without passive updating," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-77.
    9. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro’i, 2017. "Collusion and information revelation in auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 84-102.
    10. Agranov, Marina & Yariv, Leeat, 2018. "Collusion through communication in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-108.

  2. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Bribing in second-price auctions," Working Papers WP2011/7, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Jingfeng Lu & Zongwei Lu & Christian Riis, 2021. "Peace through bribing," Papers 2107.11575, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    2. Deng, Shanglyu, 2023. "Speculation in procurement auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    3. Serhat Dogan & Emin Karagözoglu & Kerim Keskin & Cagri Saglam, 2020. "Bribing in Team Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 8096, CESifo.
    4. Troyan, Peter, 2017. "Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 319-345.
    5. Jingfeng Lu & Zongwei Lu & Christian Riis, 2019. "Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request," Papers 1912.03607, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    6. Pacharasut Sujarittanonta & Ajalavat Viriyavipart, 2021. "Deterring collusion with a reserve price: an auction experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 536-557, June.

  3. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Gradual Negotiations and Proportional Solutions," Working Papers WP2011/8, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Ismail Saglam, 2017. "Iterated Kalai–Smorodinsky–Nash compromise," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 40(1), pages 335-349, November.
    2. Saglam, Ismail, 2016. "An Alternative Characterization for Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise," MPRA Paper 73564, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2021. "Step-by-step negotiations and utilitarianism," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 433-445, June.

  4. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Endogenous Bid Rotation in Repeated Auctions," Working Papers WP2011/9, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Noam Shamir, 2017. "Cartel Formation Through Strategic Information Leakage in a Distribution Channel," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 36(1), pages 70-88, January.
    2. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2020. "Self-rejecting mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 434-457.
    3. Olszewski, Wojciech & Safronov, Mikhail, 2018. "Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), September.
    4. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015. "Bribing in second-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 191-205.
    5. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    6. Olszewski, Wojciech & Safronov, Mikhail, 2018. "Efficient chip strategies in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), September.
    7. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2014. "First-best collusion without communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 224-230.
    8. Zhang, Wenzhang, 2022. "Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
    9. Shuang Xu & Yong Zhao & Yeming Gong, 2021. "Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 261-292, December.
    10. Yunjian Xu & Katrina Ligett, 2018. "Commitment in first-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(2), pages 449-489, August.
    11. Pacharasut Sujarittanonta & Ajalavat Viriyavipart, 2021. "Deterring collusion with a reserve price: an auction experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 536-557, June.
    12. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Bribing in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 214-228.

  5. Shiran Rachmilevitch, "undated". "Punishing greediness in Divide-the-dollar games," Working Papers WP2016/4, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Emin Karagözoğlu & Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2018. "Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 495-508, October.
    2. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2022. "Reasonable Nash demand games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(2), pages 319-330, September.
    3. Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2023. "(In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 175-193, March.
    4. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2020. "Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash Demand Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 639-650, June.

  6. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Fairness, Efficiency, and the Nash Bargaining Solution," Working Papers WP2011/10, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "The Nash Bargaining Solution and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Working Papers WP2012/1, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
    2. Wentao Yi & Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan & Yuzhong Yang, 2021. "Green Supply Chain Management with Nash Bargaining Loss-Averse Reference Dependence," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(24), pages 1-26, December.

  7. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Fairness in Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution," Working Papers WP2011/12, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "The Nash Bargaining Solution and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Working Papers WP2012/1, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2017. "Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(3), pages 341-351, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2017. "Axiomatizations of the equal-loss and weighted equal-loss bargaining solutions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(1), pages 1-9, June.

    Cited by:

    1. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.

  3. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2016. "Weighted randomized dictatorship and the asymmetric Nash solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 1-4.

    Cited by:

    1. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.

  4. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2016. "Approximate equilibria in strongly symmetric games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 52-57.

    Cited by:

    1. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2020. "A note on discontinuity and approximate equilibria in games with infinitely many players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    2. Conrad Kosowsky, 2023. "Nash Equilibrium and Axiom of Choice Are Equivalent," Papers 2306.01790, arXiv.org.

  5. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2015. "A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(2), pages 167-171, June.

    Cited by:

    1. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.

  6. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2015. "The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(3), pages 463-478, November.

    Cited by:

    1. D. Marc Kilgour & Rudolf Vetschera, 2024. "Two-Person Fair Division with Additive Valuations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 745-774, August.
    2. Omer F. Baris, 2018. "Timing effect in bargaining and ex ante efficiency of the relative utilitarian solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(4), pages 547-556, June.
    3. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    4. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2023. "The Nash bargaining solution: sometimes more utilitarian, sometimes more egalitarian," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 457-464, October.
    5. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2022. "Pre-bargaining Investment Implies a Pareto Ranking of Bargaining Solutions," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 769-787, August.
    6. Hwang, Sung-Ha & Lim, Wooyoung & Neary, Philip & Newton, Jonathan, 2016. "Conventional Contracts, Intentional behavior and Logit Choice: Equality Without Symmetry," Working Papers 2016-13, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    7. Magali Fia & Lorenzo Sacconi, 2019. "Justice and Corporate Governance: New Insights from Rawlsian Social Contract and Sen’s Capabilities Approach," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 160(4), pages 937-960, December.
    8. Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin, 2015. "A Tale of Two Bargaining Solutions," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(2), pages 1-14, June.
    9. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2019. "Egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(4), pages 741-751, April.
    10. Claus-Jochen Haake & Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2018. "On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem," Working Papers CIE 113, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    11. Barry Nalebuff, 2021. "A Perspective-Invariant Approach to Nash Bargaining," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(1), pages 577-593, January.
    12. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2020. "Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash Demand Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 639-650, June.

  7. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015. "Bribing in second-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 191-205.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015. "Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 107-109.

    Cited by:

    1. NAKAMURA, Kensei, 2023. "Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution with continuity and almost no individual rationality," Discussion Papers 2023-02, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    3. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2021. "No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(4), pages 855-863, May.
    4. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2021. "Step-by-step negotiations and utilitarianism," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 433-445, June.

  9. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2014. "First-best collusion without communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 224-230.

    Cited by:

    1. Noam Shamir, 2017. "Cartel Formation Through Strategic Information Leakage in a Distribution Channel," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 36(1), pages 70-88, January.
    2. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

  10. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2014. "Randomized dictatorship and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(2), pages 173-177, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Karos, Dominik & Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2018. "The Midpoint-Constrained Egalitarian Bargaining Solution," Research Memorandum 007, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    2. Karos, Dominik & Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2019. "The midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 107-112.

  11. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1714-1725.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  12. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Cooperative bargaining: Independence and monotonicity imply disagreement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 240-242.

    Cited by:

    1. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.

  13. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Bribing in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 214-228.

    Cited by:

    1. Hinloopen, Jeroen & Onderstal, Sander & Treuren, Leonard, 2020. "Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    2. Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro’i Zultan, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms And Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals And Selection," Working Papers 1406, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    3. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015. "Bribing in second-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 191-205.
    4. Jingfeng Lu & Zongwei Lu & Christian Riis, 2021. "Peace through bribing," Papers 2107.11575, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    5. Deng, Shanglyu, 2023. "Speculation in procurement auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    6. Serhat Dogan & Emin Karagözoglu & Kerim Keskin & Cagri Saglam, 2020. "Bribing in Team Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 8096, CESifo.
    7. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    8. Troyan, Peter, 2017. "Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 319-345.
    9. Jingfeng Lu & Zongwei Lu & Christian Riis, 2019. "Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request," Papers 1912.03607, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    10. Olga Gorelkina, 2014. "Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    11. Olga Gorelkina, 2018. "Collusion via Information Sharing and Optimal Auctions," Working Papers 20182, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    12. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    13. Zheng, Charles Z., 2019. "Bidding collusion without passive updating," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-77.
    14. Kotowski, Maciej Henryk & Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Bribing in First-Price Auctions: Corrigendum," Scholarly Articles 10591649, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    15. John Asker & Mariagiovanna Baccara & SangMok Lee, 2021. "Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods," NBER Working Papers 28602, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Pacharasut Sujarittanonta & Ajalavat Viriyavipart, 2021. "Deterring collusion with a reserve price: an auction experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 536-557, June.
    17. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro’i, 2017. "Collusion and information revelation in auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 84-102.
    18. Agranov, Marina & Yariv, Leeat, 2018. "Collusion through communication in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-108.

  14. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2011. "Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 63-85, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Saglam, Ismail, 2012. "A simple axiomatization of the egalitarian solution," MPRA Paper 36773, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    3. Youngsub Chun, 2021. "Axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points in 2-person bargaining problems," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 6(1), pages 37-58, December.
    4. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2022. "Pre-bargaining Investment Implies a Pareto Ranking of Bargaining Solutions," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 769-787, August.

  15. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2011. "A characterization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution by disagreement point monotonicity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(4), pages 691-696, November.

    Cited by:

    1. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    2. Youngsub Chun, 2021. "Axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points in 2-person bargaining problems," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 6(1), pages 37-58, December.
    3. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2022. "Pre-bargaining Investment Implies a Pareto Ranking of Bargaining Solutions," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 769-787, August.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 9 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (9) 2011-10-15 2011-11-01 2011-11-01 2011-11-01 2011-11-21 2012-04-23 2014-07-28 2017-04-09 2017-04-09. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (7) 2011-11-01 2011-11-01 2011-11-01 2011-11-21 2012-04-23 2014-07-28 2017-04-09. Author is listed
  3. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (3) 2012-04-23 2014-07-28 2017-04-09
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (2) 2011-10-15 2014-07-28
  5. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2011-11-01
  6. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2012-04-23

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