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Nash Equilibrium and Axiom of Choice Are Equivalent

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  • Conrad Kosowsky

Abstract

In this paper, I prove that existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in games with infinitely many players is equivalent to the axiom of choice.

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  • Conrad Kosowsky, 2023. "Nash Equilibrium and Axiom of Choice Are Equivalent," Papers 2306.01790, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2306.01790
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2306.01790
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2016. "Approximate equilibria in strongly symmetric games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 52-57.
    2. Voorneveld, Mark, 2010. "The possibility of impossible stairways: Tail events and countable player sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 403-410, January.
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