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Two-Person Fair Division with Additive Valuations

Author

Listed:
  • D. Marc Kilgour

    (Wilfrid Laurier University)

  • Rudolf Vetschera

    (University of Vienna)

Abstract

In the literature, many desirable properties for allocations of indivisible goods have been proposed, including envy-freeness, Pareto optimality, and maximization of either the total welfare of all agents, the welfare of the worst-off agent, or the Nash product of agents’ welfares. In the two-person context, we study relationships among these properties using both analytical models and simulation in a setting where individual preferences are given by additive cardinal utilities. We provide several new theorems linking these criteria and use simulation to study how their values are related to problem characteristics, assuming that utilities are assigned randomly. We draw some conclusions concerning the relation of problem characteristics to the availabilty of allocations with particular properties.

Suggested Citation

  • D. Marc Kilgour & Rudolf Vetschera, 2024. "Two-Person Fair Division with Additive Valuations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 745-774, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:33:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-024-09885-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-024-09885-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2015. "The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(3), pages 463-478, November.
    2. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour & Christian Klamler, 2017. "Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 115-131, January.
    3. Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-1039, July.
    4. Sheung Man Yuen & Warut Suksompong, 2023. "Extending the Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare," Papers 2301.03798, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2023.
    5. Yuen, Sheung Man & Suksompong, Warut, 2023. "Extending the characterization of maximum Nash welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    6. Suksompong, Warut, 2023. "A characterization of maximum Nash welfare for indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    7. Butler, John & Jia, Jianmin & Dyer, James, 1997. "Simulation techniques for the sensitivity analysis of multi-criteria decision models," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 103(3), pages 531-546, December.
    8. Kilgour, D. Marc & Vetschera, Rudolf, 2018. "Two-player fair division of indivisible items: Comparison of algorithms," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 271(2), pages 620-631.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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