Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash Demand Game
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00704-1
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
- Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2015. "The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(3), pages 463-478, November.
- Guth, Werner & Ritzberger, Klaus & van Damme, Eric, 2004.
"On the Nash bargaining solution with noise,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 697-713, June.
- Güth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise," Other publications TiSEM cd5dddf5-811b-4c0c-97d6-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Güth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise," Discussion Paper 2002-79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Güth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2004. "On the Nash Bargaining Solution with noise," Other publications TiSEM 2def5ecc-d422-4c00-b049-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2017.
"Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(3), pages 341-351, March.
- Shiran Rachmilevitch, "undated". "Punishing greediness in Divide-the-dollar games," Working Papers WP2016/4, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
- Muthoo, Abhinay, 1996.
"A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 134-152, April.
- Muthoo, Abhinay, 1993. "A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic," Economics Discussion Papers 10019, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Carlsson, Hans, 1991. "A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1487-1496, September.
- Ashlagi, Itai & Karagözoğlu, Emin & Klaus, Bettina, 2012.
"A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 228-233.
- Itai Ashlagi & Emin Karagozoglu & Bettina Klaus, 2008. "A Noncooperative Support for Equal Division in Estate Division Problems," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-069, Harvard Business School.
- Dutta, Rohan, 2012. "Bargaining with revoking costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 144-153.
- Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2015. "A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining With Endogenous Threats," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(4), pages 1641-1655, July.
- Howard, J. V., 1992. "A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 142-159, February.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Emin Karagözoğlu & Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2018. "Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 495-508, October.
- Shinsuke Kambe, 1999. "When is There a Unique Equilibrium in Less Structured Bargaining?," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 50(3), pages 321-342, September.
- Esat Cetemen & Emin Karagözoğlu, 2014. "Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 223-236, August.
- David Malueg, 2010. "Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash Demand Game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(2), pages 243-270, August.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
- Atakan Dizarlar & Emin Karagözoğlu, 2023. "Kantian equilibria of a class of Nash bargaining games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(4), pages 867-891, August.
- Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2022. "Reasonable Nash demand games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(2), pages 319-330, September.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2022. "Reasonable Nash demand games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(2), pages 319-330, September.
- Emin Karagözoğlu & Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2018. "Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 495-508, October.
- Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2023. "(In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 175-193, March.
- Nejat Anbarci & Kang Rong & Jaideep Roy, 2019. "Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 21-52, July.
- Harstad, Bård, 2023.
"Pledge-and-review bargaining,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
- Bård Harstad, 2018. "Pledge-and-Review Bargaining," CESifo Working Paper Series 7296, CESifo.
- William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
- Roberto Serrano, 2005.
"Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003,"
Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
- Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Andersson, Ola & Argenton, Cédric & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2018. "Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 1-5.
- Anbarci, Nejat & Sun, Ching-jen, 2013. "Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: A simple Nash program," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 211-214.
- Guth, Werner & Ritzberger, Klaus & van Damme, Eric, 2004.
"On the Nash bargaining solution with noise,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 697-713, June.
- Güth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise," Discussion Paper 2002-79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Güth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise," Other publications TiSEM cd5dddf5-811b-4c0c-97d6-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Güth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2004. "On the Nash Bargaining Solution with noise," Other publications TiSEM 2def5ecc-d422-4c00-b049-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Dutta, Rohan, 2012. "Bargaining with revoking costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 144-153.
- Atakan Dizarlar & Emin Karagözoğlu, 2023. "Kantian equilibria of a class of Nash bargaining games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(4), pages 867-891, August.
- Paolo Balduzzi, 2004. "Delegation Games with Full Commitment," Working Papers 70, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2004.
- Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2016.
"On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game,"
The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 83-107, December.
- Duman, Papatya & Trockel, Walter, 2016. "On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash Solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein’s game," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 550, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2010.
"Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1951-1967, September.
- Britz, V. & Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A., 2008. "Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric nash bargaining solution," Research Memorandum 018, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999.
"An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
- Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1997. "An Implementation-theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers 273398, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
- Esat Cetemen & Emin Karagözoğlu, 2014. "Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 223-236, August.
- Johannes Spinnewijn & Frans Spinnewyn, 2015.
"Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(2), pages 91-116, June.
- Johannes SPINNEWYN & Frans SPINNEWYN, 2008. "Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces0832, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
- Spinnewijn, Johannes & Spinnewyn, Frans, 2015. "Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66197, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Anbarci, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick, 2018. "How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 320-334.
- Duman, Papatya & Trockel, Walter, 2020. "Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: $H_{\alpha}$ -Essential Equilibria," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 632, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
More about this item
Keywords
Nash Demand Game; Repeated games; Fair division;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:49:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-019-00704-1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.