Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 2004.
"Collusion and Price Rigidity,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(2), pages 317-349.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 1998. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Working papers 98-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000081, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018.
"Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
- Juan F. Escobar & Gastón Llanes, 2015. "Cooperation Dynamic in Repeated Games of Adverse Selection," Documentos de Trabajo 311, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 2007.
"Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 61-92, May.
- Masaki Aoyagi, 2002. "Efficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication," ISER Discussion Paper 0566, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 2004. "Corrigendum to "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions" [J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004) 153-169]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 370-371, February.
- Athey, Susan & Bagwell, Kyle, 2001.
"Optimal Collusion with Private Information,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 428-465, Autumn.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "Optimal Collusion with Private Information," Working papers 99-17, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Eric Maskin, 2008.
"The Folk Theorem With Imperfect Public Information,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 12, pages 231-273,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2058, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine.
- Chambers, Christopher P. & Miller, Alan D., "undated". "Inefficiency," Working Papers WP2011/14, University of Haifa, Department of Economics, revised 30 Nov 2011.
- Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013.
"Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1714-1725.
- Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Endogenous Bid Rotation in Repeated Auctions," Working Papers WP2011/9, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
- Wolitzky, Alexander, 2015. "Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
- Christine Hauser & Hugo Hopenhayn, 2008. "Trading Favors: Optimal Exchange and Forgiveness," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 88, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 2004.
"Tacit collusion in repeated auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 153-169, January.
- Hopenhayn, Hugo A. & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2001. "Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions," Research Papers 1698r2, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 2003. "Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 79-105, September.
- Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998.
"Money Is Memory,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 232-251, August.
- Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1996. "Money is memory," Staff Report 218, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- , & , A., 2007.
"Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
- Susan Athey & David Miller, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Trade with Hidden Valuations," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000256, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
- Johannes Hörner & Julian Jamison, 2007. "Collusion with (almost) no information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 804-822, September.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Guilherme Carmona, 2021. "On the optimality of monetary trading," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(3), pages 1121-1160, April.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2008.
"On the role of retaliation in trade agreements,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 61-77, September.
- Alberto Martin & Wouter Vergote, 2005. "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," Economics Working Papers 914, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2008.
- MARTIN, Alberto & VERGOTE, Wouter, 2009. "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- MARTIN, Alberto & VERGOTE, Wouter, 2007. "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2007089, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Zhang, Wenzhang, 2022. "Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
- Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015.
"Bribing in second-price auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 191-205.
- Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Bribing in second-price auctions," Working Papers WP2011/7, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
- Chan, Jimmy & Zhang, Wenzhang, 2015. "Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 188-211.
- Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2006.
"Private monitoring in auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 179-211, November.
- Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2003. "Private Monitoring in Auctions," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Olszewski, Wojciech & Safronov, Mikhail, 2018. "Efficient chip strategies in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), September.
- Nicolas Gruyer, 2005. "Using lotteries in auctions when buyers collude," Economics Working Papers 02, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
- Lee, Gea M., 2010.
"Optimal collusion with internal contracting,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 646-669, March.
- Gea M. Lee, 2008. "Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting," Development Economics Working Papers 22466, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Gea Myoung Lee, 2008. "Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting," Working Papers 08-2008, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013.
"Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1714-1725.
- Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Endogenous Bid Rotation in Repeated Auctions," Working Papers WP2011/9, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
- Nicolas Gruyer, 2005. "Using lotteries in auctions when buyers collude," Working Papers hal-01021534, HAL.
- Leo, Greg, 2017. "Taking turns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 525-547.
- Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2004. "Antidumping: Welfare Enhancing Retaliation?," MPRA Paper 5416, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Aperjis, Christina & Zeckhauser, Richard J. & Miao, Yali, 2014.
"Variable temptations and black mark reputations,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 70-90.
- Christina Aperjis & Yali Miao & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 2010. "Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations," NBER Working Papers 16423, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aperjis, Christina & Miao, Yali & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2012. "Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations," Working Paper Series rwp12-055, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Aperjis, Christina & Miao, Yali & Zeckhauser, Richard Jay, 2011. "Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations," Scholarly Articles 5027138, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Miao, Yali & Zeckhauser, Richard Jay & Aperjis, Christina, 2012. "Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations," Scholarly Articles 9924086, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Aperjis, Christina & Miao, Yali & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2011. "Variable Temptations and Black Market Reputations," Working Paper Series 11-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Joseph E. Harrington Jr. & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007.
"Collusion under monitoring of sales,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 314-331, June.
- Joseph E Harrington & Jr Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2004. "Collusion under Monitoring of Sales," Economics Working Paper Archive 509, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Mar 2005.
- Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Harrington, Joseph E., 2005. "Collusion under Monitoring of Sales," Research Papers 1885, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Che,Y.-K. & Kim,J., 2004. "Collusion-proof implementation of optimal mechanisms," Working papers 4, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2008.
"Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 493-540, May.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000334, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2007. "Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000898, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 2007.
"Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 61-92, May.
- Masaki Aoyagi, 2002. "Efficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication," ISER Discussion Paper 0566, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2019.
"Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(5), pages 2269-2300.
- Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," Working Papers 072_2015, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Nicolas Gruyer, 2008. "Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...")," Economics Working Papers 06, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
- Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007.
"Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1794-1823, December.
- Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2004. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," 2004 Meeting Papers 418, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2005. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," Research Papers 1887, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
More about this item
Keywords
Repeated games; efficiency; chip strategies;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:the:publsh:2771. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Martin J. Osborne (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://econtheory.org .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.