Susanne Goldlücke
(Susanne Goldluecke)

Personal Details

First Name:	Susanne
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Goldluecke
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pgo439
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
	https://www.wiwi.uni-konstanz.de/goldluecke/
Terminal Degree:	2009 Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Fachbereich; Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Universität Konstanz

Konstanz, Germany
http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/wiwi/
RePEc:edi:fwkonde (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:

1. Engert, Andreas & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2013. "Why agents need discretion: The business judgment rule as optimal standard of care," Working Papers 13-04, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
   • Engert Andreas & Goldlücke Susanne, 2017. "Why Agents Need Discretion: The Business Judgment Rule as Optimal Standard of Care," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-38, March.

   Mentioned in:

   1. Should managers be liable in court?
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2013-03-14 20:30:00

Working papers

1. Jan Hausfeld & Konstantin Hesler & Susanne Goldlücke, 2018. "Strategic Gaze: An Interactive Eye-Tracking Study," TWI Research Paper Series 114, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
   • J. Hausfeld & K. von Hesler & S. Goldlücke, 2021. "Strategic gaze: an interactive eye-tracking study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(1), pages 177-205, March.

   Cited by:

   1. Urs Fischbacher & Jan Hausfeld & Baiba Renerte, 2020. "Strategic incentives undermine gaze as a signal of prosocial motives," TWI Research Paper Series 120, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
      • Fischbacher, Urs & Hausfeld, Jan & Renerte, Baiba, 2022. "Strategic incentives undermine gaze as a signal of prosocial motives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 63-91.
   2. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Alexander Ritschel, 2022. "Attention and salience in preference reversals," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 1024-1051, June.
      • Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Alexander Ritschel, 2021. "Attention and salience in preference reversals," ECON - Working Papers 389, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.

2. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2016. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," CEPR Discussion Papers 11217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 211-222.
   • Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," MPRA Paper 90800, University Library of Munich, Germany.

   Cited by:

   1. Patrick W Schmitz, 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper 112839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 107609, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 16003, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   3. Fabio Römeis & Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller, 2022. "Salience Bias and Overwork," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-22, January.

3. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2011. "Investments as Signals of Outside Options," CEPR Discussion Papers 8366, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Investments as signals of outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 683-708.
   • Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick, 2009. "Signaling an Outside Option," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 281, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

   Cited by:

   1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," MPRA Paper 106947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," CEPR Discussion Papers 15970, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   2. Fumitoshi Moriya & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 173-186, January.
      • MORIYA, Fumitoshi & 森谷, 文利 & YAMASHITA, Takuro & 山下, 拓朗, 2015. "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-18, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
      • Moriya, Fumitoshi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," TSE Working Papers 18-941, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
   3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 642-645.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," CEPR Discussion Papers 9065, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," MPRA Paper 53717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   4. Patrick W Schmitz, 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper 112839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 107609, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 16003, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   6. Gick, Wolfgang, 2015. "A Theory of Delegated Contracting," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113069, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
      • Gick, Wolfgang, 2016. "A Theory of Delegated Contracting," Working Paper Series 1136, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
   7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 153-165.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," MPRA Paper 90801, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   8. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J., 2016. "The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11215, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "The management of innovation: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 706-725.
   9. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J., 2018. "Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 13204, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   10. Mori, Yusuke, 2020. "Ex ante investment, ex post adaptation, and joint ownership," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
   11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," MPRA Paper 117742, University Library of Munich, Germany.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 18208, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   12. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 18048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory," MPRA Paper 117065, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   13. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 23-31.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   14. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 21-24.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered," CEPR Discussion Papers 10110, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 91457, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   15. Su, Alice Peng-Ju, 2017. "Information revelation in the Property Right Theory of the firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 133-164.
   16. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," MPRA Paper 90790, University Library of Munich, Germany.
       • Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 92-107.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 10207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   17. Rao, Neel, 2015. "General training in labor markets: Common value auctions with unobservable investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 19-45.
   18. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," MPRA Paper 91460, University Library of Munich, Germany.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 96-99.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 12174, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   19. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 15514, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 100-112.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information," MPRA Paper 105106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   20. Rao, Neel, 2022. "Search equilibrium with unobservable investment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 300-330.
   21. Gea M. Lee & Seung Han Yoo, 2013. "Unobserved Investment, Signaling, and Welfare," Discussion Paper Series 1301, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, revised 2017.
   22. Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 514-532.

4. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality," MPRA Paper 28823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.

   Cited by:

   1. Antonio Filippin & Paolo Crosetto, 2014. "A reconsideration of gender differences in risk attitudes," Post-Print hal-01997771, HAL.
      • Filippin, A. & Crosetto, P., 2014. "A reconsideration of gender differences in risk attitudes," Working Papers 2014-01, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
      • Antonio FILIPPIN & Paolo CROSETTO, 2014. "A Reconsideration of Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes," Departmental Working Papers 2014-01, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
      • Antonio Filippin & Paolo Crosetto, 2016. "A Reconsideration of Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes," Post-Print hal-01356905, HAL.
      • Filippin, Antonio & Crosetto, Paolo, 2014. "A Reconsideration of Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes," IZA Discussion Papers 8184, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership," CEPR Discussion Papers 13881, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership," MPRA Paper 95637, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   3. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 211-222.
      • Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," MPRA Paper 90800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2016. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," CEPR Discussion Papers 11217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   4. Siegert, Caspar & Trepper, Piers, 2015. "Optimal tolerance for failure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 41-55.
   5. At Christian & Friehe Tim & Gabuthy Yannick, 2019. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 1-11, April.
      • Christian At & Tim Friehe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2019. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," Post-Print hal-02309475, HAL.
      • Christian At & Tim Friehe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2018. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," Working Papers of BETA 2018-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
   6. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Nieken, Petra, 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 8241, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 372, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
      • Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 1000-1008.
   7. Axelson, Ulf & Bond, Philip, 2011. "Investment banking careers: an equilibrium theory of overpaid jobs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119062, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
   8. Patrick W Schmitz, 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper 112839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   9. Demougin, Dominique & Helm, Carsten, 2011. "Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(7), pages 964-979.
   10. Esteve González, Patrícia, 2014. "Moral Hazard in Repeated Procurement of Services," Working Papers 2072/237593, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
       • Esteve-González, Patricia, 2016. "Moral hazard in repeated procurement of services," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 244-269.
   11. Schmitz, Patrick W. & ,, 2018. "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," CEPR Discussion Papers 13406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
       • Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," MPRA Paper 95615, University Library of Munich, Germany.
       • Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2021. "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(1), pages 238-266, January.
   12. Kräkel, Matthias, 2016. "Peer effects and incentives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 120-127.
       • Kräkel, Matthias, 2014. "Peer Effects and Incentives," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 03/2014, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
   13. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2012. "Internal labor markets and worker rents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 491-509.
   14. Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Marco Buso & Anne Stenger, 2020. "Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty: The dark side of public financing," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 769-820, June.
       • Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Marco Buso & Anne Stenger, 2020. "Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty : The dark side of public financing," Post-Print hal-02893442, HAL.
       • Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Marco Buso & Anne Stenger, 2016. "Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty: the dark side of public financing," Working Papers of BETA 2016-12, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
   15. Au, Pak Hung & Chen, Bin R., 2019. "Objective and subjective indicators in long-term contracting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 309-331.
   16. David Martimort & Stéphane Straub, 2016. "How To Design Infrastructure Contracts In A Warming World: A Critical Appraisal Of Public–Private Partnerships," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(1), pages 61-88, February.
       • Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2012. "How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World? A Critical Appraisal of Public-Private Partnerships," IDEI Working Papers 724, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
       • Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2012. "How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World? A Critical Appraisal of Public-Private Partnerships," TSE Working Papers 12-315, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
       • David Martimort & Stephane Straub, 2016. "How to design infrastructure contracts in a warning world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01328640, HAL.
       • David Martimort & Stephane Straub, 2016. "How to design infrastructure contracts in a warning world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships," Post-Print halshs-01328640, HAL.
   17. Axelson, Ulf & Bond, Philip, 2015. "Wall Street occupations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 37448, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
   18. Kräkel, Matthias, 2017. "Self-organizing teams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 195-197.
   19. Ulf Axelson & Philip Bond, 2011. "Investment banking careers: An equilibrium theory of overpaid jobs," FMG Discussion Papers dp690, Financial Markets Group.
   20. Leshem, Shmuel & Tabbach, Avraham, 2023. "The option value of record-based sanctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 1-22.
   21. Graham, Brad & Robles, Jack, 2016. "Attorney fees in repeated relationships," Working Paper Series 19420, Victoria University of Wellington, School of Economics and Finance.
       • Brad Graham & Jack Robles, 2019. "Attorney fees in repeated relationships," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 127(2), pages 99-124, July.
   22. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted," MPRA Paper 90792, University Library of Munich, Germany.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted," CEPR Discussion Papers 10249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
       • Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 116-120.
   23. Lang, Matthias, 2022. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 329, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
       • Matthias Lang, 2021. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 9458, CESifo.
       • Matthias Lang, 2023. "Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(1), pages 104-134, March.
   24. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 108-117.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," MPRA Paper 36914, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   25. Stephen Spear & Cheng Wang, "undated". "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E5, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
       • Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005. "When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 239-256, February.
       • Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005. "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11443, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
   26. Weinschenk, Philipp, 2017. "Working conditions and regulation," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 177-191.
   27. At, Christian & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2015. "Moral hazard and agency relationship in sequential litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 86-90.
       • Christian At & Yannick Gabuthy, 2015. "Moral Hazard and Agency Relationship in Sequential Litigation," Post-Print halshs-01309094, HAL.
   28. Luigi Balletta & Giovanni Immordino, 2013. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with a Present Biased Agent," CSEF Working Papers 341, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
   29. Matthias Fahn & Anne Schade & Katharina Schüßler, 2017. "What Drives Reciprocal Behavior? The Optimal Provision of Incentives over the Course of Careers," CESifo Working Paper Series 6635, CESifo.
   30. Jiancai Pi, 2021. "An investigation of seeming favoritism in public procurement," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(1), pages 128-137, January.
   31. Mol, Jantsje M. & Botzen, W. J. Wouter & Blasch, Julia E., 2020. "Risk reduction in compulsory disaster insurance: Experimental evidence on moral hazard and financial incentives," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
   32. Mahmoud Sami Nabi, 2016. "Revisiting equity and debt: access to finance and economic inefficiency," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 63(4), pages 393-429, December.
   33. Christian Lukas, 2023. "On interim performance evaluations and interdependent period outcomes," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 67-108, March.
   34. Pi, Jiancai, 2014. "Job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 274-277.
   35. Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 03/2013, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
       • Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 412, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
       • Matthias Kräkel, 2017. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(2), pages 295-311, April.
       • Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," IZA Discussion Papers 7271, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   36. Marco Buso & Luciano Greco, 2021. "The Optimality of Public-Private Partnerships under Financial and Fiscal Constraints," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0276, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
       • Marco Buso & Luciano Greco, 2023. "The optimality of public–private partnerships under financial and fiscal constraints," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(4), pages 856-881, October.
   37. Nicolas Quérou & Antoine Soubeyran & Raphael Soubeyran, 2020. "Contracting Under Unverifiable Monetary Costs," Post-Print hal-02866383, HAL.
       • Nicolas Quérou & Antoine Soubeyran & Raphael Soubeyran, 2020. "Contracting under unverifiable monetary costs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 892-909, October.
   38. Wang, Cheng, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5248, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
       • Cheng Wang, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(3), pages 396-422, July.
   39. Lorens Imhof & Matthias Kräkel, 2016. "Ex post unbalanced tournaments," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(1), pages 73-98, February.
   40. Fabio Römeis & Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller, 2022. "Salience Bias and Overwork," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-22, January.
   41. Bin R. Chen & Sanxi Li, 2018. "Prehire Screening and Subjective Performance Evaluations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(10), pages 4953-4965, October.
   42. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2015. "Merger efficiency and managerial incentives," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 51-63.
       • Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Merger Efficiency and Managerial Incentives," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 410, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   43. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2016. "Optimal sales force compensation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 179-195.
       • Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner, 2014. "Optimal Sales Force Compensation," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2014-09, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
   44. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract," MPRA Paper 106427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Müller, Daniel, 2020. "The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract," CEPR Discussion Papers 15567, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
       • Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 653-669.
   45. Christian Lukas, 2017. "Contract design in dynamic agency: An experimental analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 38(8), pages 1216-1226, December.
   46. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Bad Mergers Revisited: An Incentive Perspective," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79914, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
   47. Ulf Axelson & Philip Bond, 2015. "Wall Street Occupations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(5), pages 1949-1996, October.
   48. Kräkel, Matthias, 2021. "On the delegation of authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 965-981.
   49. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Friebel, Guido & von Bieberstein, Frauke, 2016. "The firm as the locus of social comparisons: Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 41-59.
   50. Daniel Müller & Philipp Weinschenk, 2015. "Rater Bias and Incentive Provision," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 833-862, October.
   51. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2014. "Merger Performance and Managerial Incentives," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 02/2014, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
   52. Khanna, Naveen & Mathews, Richmond D., 2022. "Skill versus reliability in venture capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 41-63.
   53. Christian Lukas, 2023. "On costless‐renegotiation proofing in binary agency models," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(4), pages 2481-2494, June.
   54. Thomas Kohler & Fabian Schmitz, 2020. "Do Non-Compete Clauses Undermine Minimum Wages?," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 021, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

5. Goldluecke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2010. "In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 332, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   • Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2012. "Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1191-1221.

   Cited by:

   1. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Renegotiation-proof relational contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 157-178.
   2. Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000676, David K. Levine.
      • Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1888, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
      • Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
   3. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2015. "Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001179, UCLA Department of Economics.
      • Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2015. "Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 21457, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   4. Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1847, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
      • Susanne Goldlücke & Sebastian Kranz, 2018. "Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 235-263, July.
      • Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000423, David K. Levine.
   5. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hongyi, 2021. "Relational communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(4), November.
      • Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2019. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12a, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
      • Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi Li, 2019. "Relational Communication," Papers 1901.05645, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
      • Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2018. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
      • Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2020. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12b, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
   6. David K. Levine, 2021. "Fine cartels," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 155-166, October.
   7. Richter, Michael, 2014. "Fully absorbing dynamic compromise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 92-104.
   8. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2017. "Reconciliating Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 12540, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   9. Samuelson, Larry & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2017. "Even up: Maintaining relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 170-217.
   10. Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & Evagelos Pafilis, 2018. "Common Ownership of Public Goods," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 18/700, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
       • Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija & Pafilis, Evagelos, 2020. "Common ownership of public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 555-578.
   11. Watson, Joel, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt19f9w2xf, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
       • Joel Watson, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 631-659, August.
   12. Heidi Gjertsen & Theodore Groves & David A Miller & Eduard Niesten & Dale Squires & Joel Watson, 2021. "Conservation Agreements: Relational Contracts with Endogenous Monitoring," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 1-40.
       • Gjertsen, Heidi & Groves, Theodore & Miller, David A & Niesten, Eduard & Squires, Dale & Watson, Joel, 2021. "Conservation Agreements: Relational Contracts with Endogenous Monitoring," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt6zq3g110, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
   13. David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2013. "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2303-2350, November.
   14. Do, Jihwan, 2022. "Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
   15. Heidi Gjertsen & Theodore Groves & David A. Miller & Eduard Niesten & Dale Squires & Joel Watson, 2014. "A Contract-theoretic Model of Conservation Agreements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Kaddour Hadri & William Mikhail (ed.), Econometric Methods and Their Applications in Finance, Macro and Related Fields, chapter 15, pages 425-455, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
       • Gjertsen, Heidi & Groves, Theodore & Miller, David A & Niesten, Eduard & Squires, Dale & Watson, Joel, 2014. "A Contract-theoretic Model of Conservation Agreements," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3sx7q32j, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
   16. Emilio Bisetti & Benjamin Tengelsen & Ariel Zetlin‐Jones, 2022. "Moral Hazard In Remote Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1595-1623, November.
   17. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2012. "Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 405-407.
   18. Blonski, Matthias & Herbold, Daniel, 2024. "Partnerships based on Joint Ownership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 183-202.

6. Kranz, Sebastian & Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2009. "Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 259, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

   Cited by:

   1. Goldluecke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2010. "In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 332, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
      • Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2012. "Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1191-1221.
   2. Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000676, David K. Levine.
      • Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1888, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
      • Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
   3. Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1847, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
      • Susanne Goldlücke & Sebastian Kranz, 2018. "Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 235-263, July.
      • Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000423, David K. Levine.
   4. Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2010. "Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 725, Stockholm School of Economics.
      • Andersson Ola & Wengström Erik, 2010. "Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-12, December.
   5. James Malcomson, 2010. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Economics Series Working Papers 508, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
      • James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.

7. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

   Cited by:

   1. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Nieken, Petra, 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 8241, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 372, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
      • Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 1000-1008.
   2. David Martimort & Stéphane Straub, 2016. "How To Design Infrastructure Contracts In A Warming World: A Critical Appraisal Of Public–Private Partnerships," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(1), pages 61-88, February.
      • Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2012. "How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World? A Critical Appraisal of Public-Private Partnerships," IDEI Working Papers 724, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
      • Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2012. "How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World? A Critical Appraisal of Public-Private Partnerships," TSE Working Papers 12-315, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
      • David Martimort & Stephane Straub, 2016. "How to design infrastructure contracts in a warning world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01328640, HAL.
      • David Martimort & Stephane Straub, 2016. "How to design infrastructure contracts in a warning world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships," Post-Print halshs-01328640, HAL.
   3. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2008. "Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments," IZA Discussion Papers 3702, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
      • Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2008. "Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 245, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
      • Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2008. "Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 16/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
   4. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2009. "Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 8/2009, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
      • Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2010. "Minimum wages and excessive effort supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 341-344, September.
      • Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2009. "Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 264, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   5. Stephen Spear & Cheng Wang, "undated". "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E5, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
      • Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005. "When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 239-256, February.
      • Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005. "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11443, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
   6. David Martimort & Stéphane Straub, 2011. "How to Design Public-Private Partnerships in a Warming World? - When Infrastructure Becomes a Really “Hot” Topic," Working Papers 2011/25, Maastricht School of Management.
   7. Lehmann, Stefanie Aniela, 2008. "When Randomization in Collective Tournaments is Profitable for the Principal," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 19/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
   8. Wang, Cheng, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5248, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
      • Cheng Wang, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(3), pages 396-422, July.

8. Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2008. "Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 231, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   • Susanne Ohlendorf, 2009. "Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1608-1618, September.
   • Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2006. "Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 25/2006, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).

   Cited by:

   1. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Investments as signals of outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 683-708.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2011. "Investments as Signals of Outside Options," CEPR Discussion Papers 8366, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   2. Goller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "Breach Remedies Inducing Hybrid Investments," Working Papers 72, Yale University, Department of Economics.
      • Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2014. "Breach remedies inducing hybrid investments," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 26-38.
   3. Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000676, David K. Levine.
      • Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1888, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
      • Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
   4. Schweizer, Urs, 2016. "Efficient incentives from obligation law and the compensation principle," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 54-62.
   5. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick, 2009. "Signaling an Outside Option," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 281, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2011. "Investments as Signals of Outside Options," CEPR Discussion Papers 8366, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 9141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 94-96.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," MPRA Paper 41730, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   7. Daniel Göller, 2014. "Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 16(2), pages 473-498.
      • Göller, Daniel, 2012. "Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
   8. Bragelien, Iver & Impink, Joost, 2014. "Relationship-Specificity, Bargaining Power Growth, and Firm Performance," Discussion Papers 2014/4, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
   9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," MPRA Paper 44953, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 28-31.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 9281, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   10. Rebecca Stone & Alexander Stremitzer, 2020. "Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-In," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(1), pages 33-72.
   11. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 186-199, September.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2009. "Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   12. Alessandro De Chiara, 2018. "Courts' Decisions, Cooperative Investments, and Incomplete Contracts," CEU Working Papers 2018_5, Department of Economics, Central European University.

Articles

1. J. Hausfeld & K. von Hesler & S. Goldlücke, 2021. "Strategic gaze: an interactive eye-tracking study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(1), pages 177-205, March.
   • Jan Hausfeld & Konstantin Hesler & Susanne Goldlücke, 2018. "Strategic Gaze: An Interactive Eye-Tracking Study," TWI Research Paper Series 114, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
   See citations under working paper version above.
2. Susanne Goldlücke & Sebastian Kranz, 2018. "Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 235-263, July.
   • Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1847, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   • Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000423, David K. Levine.

   Cited by:

   1. Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000676, David K. Levine.
      • Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1888, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
      • Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
   2. Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1847, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
      • Susanne Goldlücke & Sebastian Kranz, 2018. "Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 235-263, July.
      • Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000423, David K. Levine.
   3. Li, Peixuan & Dang, Chuangyin & Herings, P.J.J., 2023. "Computing Perfect Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games," Other publications TiSEM 5b68f5d7-3209-4a1b-924c-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   4. Li, Peixuan & Dang, Chuangyin & Herings, P.J.J., 2023. "Computing Perfect Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games," Discussion Paper 2023-006, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
      • Peixuan Li & Chuangyin Dang & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2024. "Computing perfect stationary equilibria in stochastic games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(2), pages 347-387, September.

3. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 211-222.
   • Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," MPRA Paper 90800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2016. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," CEPR Discussion Papers 11217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   See citations under working paper version above.
4. Goldlücke, Susanne, 2017. "Strategic recruiting in ongoing hierarchies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 176-178.

   Cited by:

   1. Desmond Eseoghene Ighravwe & Sunday Ayoola Oke, 2019. "An integrated approach of SWARA and fuzzy COPRAS for maintenance technicians’ selection factors ranking," International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management, Springer;The Society for Reliability, Engineering Quality and Operations Management (SREQOM),India, and Division of Operation and Maintenance, Lulea University of Technology, Sweden, vol. 10(6), pages 1615-1626, December.
   2. Emre Ekinci, 2022. "Monetary rewards in employee referral programs," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 90(1), pages 35-58, January.

5. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Investments as signals of outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 683-708.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2011. "Investments as Signals of Outside Options," CEPR Discussion Papers 8366, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   See citations under working paper version above.
6. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Renegotiation-proof relational contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 157-178.

   Cited by:

   1. Miller, David & Olsen, Trond E. & Watson, Joel, 2018. "Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement," Discussion Papers 2018/8, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
      • Watson, Joel & Miller, David A & Olsen, Trond E, 2020. "Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt6ts1j6hf, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
      • Joel Watson & David A. Miller & Trond E. Olsen, 2020. "Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(7), pages 2153-2197, July.
   2. Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000676, David K. Levine.
      • Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1888, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
      • Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
   3. Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1847, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
      • Susanne Goldlücke & Sebastian Kranz, 2018. "Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 235-263, July.
      • Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000423, David K. Levine.
   4. Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 163-199.
      • Matthias Lang, 2012. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Apr 2018.
      • Matthias Lang, 2014. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4830, CESifo.
      • Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Munich Reprints in Economics 78243, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
      • Lang, Matthias, 2018. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 120, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
   5. Lang, Matthias, 2022. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 329, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
      • Matthias Lang, 2021. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 9458, CESifo.
      • Matthias Lang, 2023. "Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(1), pages 104-134, March.
   6. MacLeod, W. Bentley & Malcomson, James, 2023. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On," IZA Discussion Papers 15881, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
      • W. Bentley MacLeod & James Malcomson, 2023. "Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment: thirty years on," Economics Series Working Papers 997, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
      • W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 2023. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 179(3-4), pages 470-499.
   7. Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2010. "Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 725, Stockholm School of Economics.
      • Andersson Ola & Wengström Erik, 2010. "Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-12, December.
   8. James Malcomson, 2015. "Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 5462, CESifo.
      • James Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information," Economics Series Working Papers 633, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
      • James M. Malcomson, 2016. "Relational Incentive Contracts With Persistent Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 317-346, January.
   9. Watson, Joel, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt19f9w2xf, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
      • Joel Watson, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 631-659, August.
   10. Heidi Gjertsen & Theodore Groves & David A Miller & Eduard Niesten & Dale Squires & Joel Watson, 2021. "Conservation Agreements: Relational Contracts with Endogenous Monitoring," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 1-40.
       • Gjertsen, Heidi & Groves, Theodore & Miller, David A & Niesten, Eduard & Squires, Dale & Watson, Joel, 2021. "Conservation Agreements: Relational Contracts with Endogenous Monitoring," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt6zq3g110, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
   11. David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2013. "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2303-2350, November.
   12. Heidi Gjertsen & Theodore Groves & David A. Miller & Eduard Niesten & Dale Squires & Joel Watson, 2014. "A Contract-theoretic Model of Conservation Agreements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Kaddour Hadri & William Mikhail (ed.), Econometric Methods and Their Applications in Finance, Macro and Related Fields, chapter 15, pages 425-455, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
       • Gjertsen, Heidi & Groves, Theodore & Miller, David A & Niesten, Eduard & Squires, Dale & Watson, Joel, 2014. "A Contract-theoretic Model of Conservation Agreements," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3sx7q32j, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
   13. Blonski, Matthias & Herbold, Daniel, 2024. "Partnerships based on Joint Ownership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 183-202.

7. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2012. "Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 405-407.

   Cited by:

   1. Stefano Dughera, 2020. "Skills, preferences and rights: evolutionary complementarities in labor organization," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 843-866, July.

8. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.
   • Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality," MPRA Paper 28823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   See citations under working paper version above.
9. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2012. "Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1191-1221.
   • Goldluecke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2010. "In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 332, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   See citations under working paper version above.
10. Susanne Ohlendorf, 2009. "Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1608-1618, September.
    • Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2008. "Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 231, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    • Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2006. "Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 25/2006, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    See citations under working paper version above.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 15 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (7) 2016-05-21 2018-02-05 2018-03-05 2019-01-21 2019-02-04 2021-01-04 2021-05-17. Author is listed
2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (6) 2008-04-12 2009-05-16 2010-08-28 2018-02-05 2019-03-25 2021-05-17. Author is listed
3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (4) 2008-04-12 2009-11-07 2011-02-26 2016-05-21
4. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (3) 2008-04-15 2011-02-26 2013-03-02
5. NEP-DES: Economic Design (2) 2021-01-04 2021-05-17
6. NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (2) 2016-05-21 2019-01-21
7. NEP-PPM: Project, Program and Portfolio Management (2) 2008-04-12 2011-02-26
8. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2019-03-25
9. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2013-03-02
10. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2008-04-15
11. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2018-03-05

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