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A Contract-theoretic Model of Conservation Agreements

In: Econometric Methods and Their Applications in Finance, Macro and Related Fields

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  • Heidi Gjertsen
  • Theodore Groves
  • David A. Miller
  • Eduard Niesten
  • Dale Squires
  • Joel Watson

Abstract

The following sections are included:IntroductionCase Study: Forest Protection in CambodiaModeling ApproachAnalysis and ResultsAdditional Case StudiesConclusionAppendix: A Detailed ConstructionReferences

Suggested Citation

  • Heidi Gjertsen & Theodore Groves & David A. Miller & Eduard Niesten & Dale Squires & Joel Watson, 2014. "A Contract-theoretic Model of Conservation Agreements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Kaddour Hadri & William Mikhail (ed.), Econometric Methods and Their Applications in Finance, Macro and Related Fields, chapter 15, pages 425-455, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814513470_0015
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