Even up: Maintaining relationships
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.002
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- Forand, Jean Guillaume & Zapal, Jan, 2020. "Production priorities in dynamic relationships," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
- Leduc, Mathieu V., 2024. "Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 27-53.
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More about this item
Keywords
Favors; Transfers; Continuation values; Repeated games; Relationships; Incentives;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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