Goksel Asan
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First Name: | Goksel |
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Last Name: | Asan |
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RePEc Short-ID: | pas135 |
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Affiliation
(in no particular order)
Murat Sertel İleri İktisadi Araştırmalar Merkezi (Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies)
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi (Istanbul Bilgi University)
İstanbul, Turkeyhttp://mscenter.bilgi.edu.tr/
RePEc:edi:msbiltr (more details at EDIRC)
İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi (Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences)
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi (Istanbul Bilgi University)
İstanbul, Turkeyhttp://www.bilgi.edu.tr/tr/programlar-ve-okullar/lisans/iktisadi-ve-idari-bilimler-fakultesi/
RePEc:edi:deibitr (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: ArticlesArticles
- Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.
- Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Articles
- Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006.
"Maskin monotonic aggregation rules,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.
Cited by:
- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2013.
"Anonymous and neutral majority rules,"
Working Papers - Mathematical Economics
2013-02, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, revised Oct 2013.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2014. "Anonymous and neutral majority rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 377-401, August.
- Matías Núñez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021.
"On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 421-441, February.
- Matias Nunez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2020. "On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules," Post-Print hal-03092402, HAL.
- Ali Ihsan Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2016.
"Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter?,"
AMSE Working Papers
1643, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
- Ozkes, Ali Ihsan & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2017. "Absolute qualified majoritarianism: How does the threshold matter?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 20-22.
- Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Remzi Sanver, 2017. "Absolute qualified majoritarianism: how does the threshold matter?," Post-Print hal-01498509, HAL.
- Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Remzi Sanver, 2016. "Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter?," Working Papers halshs-01416727, HAL.
- Uuganbaatar Ninjbat, 2019. "Monotonicity and qualified majority rules," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 209-220, December.
- Nuñez, M. & Valletta, G., 2012. "The information simplicity of scoring rules," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2010. "Strategy-proofness and weighted voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 15-23, July.
- Powers, R.C., 2010. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules and partial anonymity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 12-14, January.
- Matías Núñez & Giacomo Valletta, 2015. "The informational basis of scoring rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(4), pages 279-297, December.
- Kivinen, Steven, 2023. "On the manipulability of equitable voting rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 286-302.
- Perry, Jonathan & Powers, Robert C., 2010. "Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 57-60, July.
- Susumu Cato & Stéphane Gonzalez & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2022. "Approval voting versus proportional threshold methods: so far and yet so near," Working Papers halshs-03858356, HAL.
- Bonifacio Llamazares, 2013. "On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 239-248, September.
- Mateusz Krukowski, 2023. "Majority rule as a unique voting method in elections with multiple candidates," Papers 2310.12983, arXiv.org.
- Nicolas Houy, 2007. "A new characterization of absolute qualified majority voting," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(4), pages 1-8.
- Susumu Cato & Daisuke Hirata, 2010. "Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(4), pages 611-630, April.
- Houy, Nicolas, 2007. "A characterization for qualified majority voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 17-24, July.
- Hoots, Lucas & Powers, Robert C., 2015. "Anonymous and positively responsive aggregation rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 9-14.
- Perry, Jonathan & Powers, Robert C., 2008. "Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 108-110, July.
- Can, Burak & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2009. "Stereotype formation as trait aggregation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 226-237, September.
- Susumu Cato, 2011. "Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 503-518, October.
- M. Sanver, 2009. "Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 159-171, June.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2013.
"Anonymous and neutral majority rules,"
Working Papers - Mathematical Economics
2013-02, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, revised Oct 2013.
- Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002.
"Another characterization of the majority rule,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
Cited by:
- Sanne Zwart, 2010. "Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(4), pages 643-677, April.
- Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.
- Adrian Miroiu, 2013. "Responsiveness axioms and the majority rule," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 740-746.
- Adrian Miroiu, 2021. "Majority Voting and Higher-Order Societies," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(5), pages 983-999, October.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2013.
"Anonymous and neutral majority rules,"
Working Papers - Mathematical Economics
2013-02, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, revised Oct 2013.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2014. "Anonymous and neutral majority rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 377-401, August.
- Emre Doğan & M. Sanver, 2008. "Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 495-506, April.
- Antonio Quesada, 2013. "The Majority Rule with Arbitrators," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 321-330, March.
- Ali Ihsan Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2016.
"Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter?,"
AMSE Working Papers
1643, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
- Ozkes, Ali Ihsan & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2017. "Absolute qualified majoritarianism: How does the threshold matter?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 20-22.
- Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Remzi Sanver, 2017. "Absolute qualified majoritarianism: how does the threshold matter?," Post-Print hal-01498509, HAL.
- Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Remzi Sanver, 2016. "Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter?," Working Papers halshs-01416727, HAL.
- İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2006. "Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 211-219, August.
- Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2023. "An extension of May's Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting," Papers 2312.14256, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
- Miroiu, Adrian, 2004. "Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 359-363, December.
- Nuñez, M. & Valletta, G., 2012. "The information simplicity of scoring rules," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Josep Freixas & Montserrat Pons, 2021. "An extension and an alternative characterization of May’s theorem," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 302(1), pages 137-150, July.
- Gersbach, Hans & Tejada, Oriol, 2020.
"Semi-flexible Majority Rules for Public Good Provision,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
15099, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hans Gersbach & Oriol Tejada, 2024. "Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(3), pages 677-715, November.
- Remzi Sanver, M., 2006. "Nash implementation of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 369-372, June.
- Matías Núñez & Giacomo Valletta, 2015. "The informational basis of scoring rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(4), pages 279-297, December.
- Quesada, Antonio, 2011.
"Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 151-154, May.
- Quesada, Antonio, 2009. "Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity," MPRA Paper 19401, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Quesada, Antonio, 2010. "Monotonicity + efficiency + continuity = majority," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 149-153, September.
- Quesada, Antonio, 2009.
"A short step between democracy and dictatorship,"
MPRA Paper
19455, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Antonio Quesada, 2012. "A short step between democracy and dictatorship," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 149-166, February.
- McMorris, F.R. & Mulder, Henry Martyn & Novick, Beth & Powers, Robert C., 2021. "Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 164-174.
- Marchant, Thierry, 2007. "An axiomatic characterization of different majority concepts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 179(1), pages 160-173, May.
- Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2013. "Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: Selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 10-12.
- F. McMorris & R. Powers, 2008. "The majority decision function for trees with 3 leaves," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 169-175, October.
- Yi, Jianxin, 2005. "A complete characterization of majority rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 109-112, April.
- Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2021. "Axioms for defeat in democratic elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 475-524, October.
- Bandhu, Sarvesh & Lahiri, Abhinaba & Pramanik, Anup, 2020. "A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
- José Carlos R. Alcantud, 2020. "Simple Majorities with Voice but No Vote," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(5), pages 803-822, October.
- Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2011. "Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 272-273, March.
- Bonifacio Llamazares, 2013. "On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 239-248, September.
- Mateusz Krukowski, 2023. "Majority rule as a unique voting method in elections with multiple candidates," Papers 2310.12983, arXiv.org.
- José Luis Garcí a-Lapresta & Bonifacio Llamazares, 2010. "Preference Intensities and Majority Decisions Based on Difference of Support Between Alternatives," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 19(6), pages 527-542, November.
- Quesada, Antonio, 2009. "Decision by majority and the right to vote," MPRA Paper 19400, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Woeginger, Gerhard J., 2005. "More on the majority rule: Profiles, societies, and responsiveness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 7-11, July.
- Antonio Quesada, 2013. "The majority rule with a chairman," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 679-691, March.
- Hoots, Lucas & Powers, Robert C., 2015. "Anonymous and positively responsive aggregation rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 9-14.
- Alcantud, José Carlos R., 2019. "Yet another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 52-55.
- Gersbach, Hans, 2017. "Flexible Majority Rules in democracyville: A guided tour," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 37-43.
- J. Woeginger, Gerhard, 2003. "A new characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 89-94, October.
- McMorris, F.R. & Powers, R.C., 2013. "Majority decision on median semilattices," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 48-51.
- Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2020. "Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections," Papers 2008.08451, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
- Llamazares, Bonifacio, 2006. "The forgotten decision rules: Majority rules based on difference of votes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 311-326, May.
- Xu, Yongsheng & Zhong, Zhen, 2010. "Single profile of preferences with variable societies: A characterization of simple majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 119-121, May.
- Susumu Cato, 2011. "Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 503-518, October.
- M. Sanver, 2009. "Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 159-171, June.
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