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Stereotype formation as trait aggregation

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  • Can, Burak
  • Sanver, M. Remzi

Abstract

We propose an aggregation model which explains stereotype formation under the attribution hypothesis. We show, under very mild axioms, that an observer can be thought of perceiving a group in terms of her subjective opinion about the representativeness of subgroups, as well as a possible prejudice she might have.

Suggested Citation

  • Can, Burak & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2009. "Stereotype formation as trait aggregation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 226-237, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:58:y:2009:i:2:p:226-237
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Denis Bouyssou & M. Remzi Sanver, 2022. "Simple but Powerful Models of Stereotype Formation," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 73(6), pages 1055-1068.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stereotype Majority rule Prejudice;

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