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Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter?

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Abstract

We study absolute qualified majority rules in a setting with more than two alternatives. We show that given two qualified majority rules, if transitivity is desired for the societal outcome and if the thresholds of one of these rules are at least as high as the other's for any pair of alternatives, then at each preference profile the rule with higher thresholds results in a coarser social ranking. Hence all absolute qualified majority rules can be expressed as specific coarsenings of the simple majority rule.

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  • Ali Ihsan Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2016. "Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter?," AMSE Working Papers 1643, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1643
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.
    2. J. Woeginger, Gerhard, 2003. "A new characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 89-94, October.
    3. Nicolas Houy, 2007. "A new characterization of absolute qualified majority voting," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(4), pages 1-8.
    4. Houy, Nicolas, 2007. "A characterization for qualified majority voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 17-24, July.
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    6. Llamazares, Bonifacio, 2006. "The forgotten decision rules: Majority rules based on difference of votes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 311-326, May.
    7. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
    8. Miroiu, Adrian, 2004. "Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 359-363, December.
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    10. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2008. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 949-973, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cailloux, Olivier & Hervouin, Matthieu & Ozkes, Ali I. & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2024. "Classification aggregation without unanimity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 6-9.
    2. Susumu Cato & Stéphane Gonzalez & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2022. "Approval voting versus proportional threshold methods: so far and yet so near," Working Papers halshs-03858356, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    simple majority rule; qualified majority rules;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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