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Monotonicity + efficiency + continuity = majority

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  • Quesada, Antonio

Abstract

Axioms of monotonicity, efficiency and continuity are shown to characterize the relative majority rule when there are only two alternatives. The absolute majority rule and the relative majority rule in which indifferences are resolved following some given tie-breaking rule are also characterized using those axioms. The strategy followed in these two characterizations consists of: (i) identifying a domain D where the relative majority rule coincides with the characterized rule; and (ii) making the value of elements not in D coincide with the value of some element in D.

Suggested Citation

  • Quesada, Antonio, 2010. "Monotonicity + efficiency + continuity = majority," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 149-153, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:60:y:2010:i:2:p:149-153
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fishburn, P. C., 1983. "A new characterization of simple majority," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 31-35.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:4:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Nicolas Houy, 2007. "A new characterization of absolute qualified majority voting," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(4), pages 1-8.
    4. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
    5. Xu, Yongsheng & Zhong, Zhen, 2010. "Single profile of preferences with variable societies: A characterization of simple majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 119-121, May.
    6. Miroiu, Adrian, 2004. "Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 359-363, December.
    7. Woeginger, Gerhard J., 2005. "More on the majority rule: Profiles, societies, and responsiveness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 7-11, July.
    8. J. Woeginger, Gerhard, 2003. "A new characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 89-94, October.
    9. Llamazares, Bonifacio, 2006. "The forgotten decision rules: Majority rules based on difference of votes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 311-326, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bonifacio Llamazares, 2013. "On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 239-248, September.
    2. José Carlos R. Alcantud, 2020. "Simple Majorities with Voice but No Vote," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(5), pages 803-822, October.
    3. Alcantud, José Carlos R., 2019. "Yet another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 52-55.
    4. McMorris, F.R. & Mulder, Henry Martyn & Novick, Beth & Powers, Robert C., 2021. "Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 164-174.
    5. Fasil Alemante & Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2016. "Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(4), pages 765-783, October.
    6. Bandhu, Sarvesh & Lahiri, Abhinaba & Pramanik, Anup, 2020. "A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).

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