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How to Avoid Black Markets for Appointments with Online Booking Systems

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  • Rustamdjan Hakimov
  • Heller, C.-Philipp
  • Kübler, Dorothea
  • Kurino, Morimitsu

Abstract

Allocating appointment slots is presented as a new application for market design. Online booking systems are commonly used by public authorities to allocate appointments for visa interviews, driver's licenses, passport renewals, etc. We document that black markets for appointments have developed in many parts of the world. Scalpers book the appointments that are offered for free and sell the slots to appointment seekers. We model the existing first-come-first-served booking system and propose an alternative batch system. The batch system collects applications for slots over a certain time period and then randomly allocates slots to applicants. The theory predicts and lab experiments confirm that scalpers profitably book and sell slots under the current system with sufficiently high demand, but that they are not active in the proposed batch system. We discuss practical issues for the implementation of the batch system and its applicability to other markets with scalping.

Suggested Citation

  • Rustamdjan Hakimov & Heller, C.-Philipp & Kübler, Dorothea & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2021. "How to Avoid Black Markets for Appointments with Online Booking Systems," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 111(7), pages 2127-2151.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:235248
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191204
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    Cited by:

    1. Kübler, Dorothea, 2021. "Marktdesign und die Verteilung von Impfstoff," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 101(8), pages 597-600.
    2. Derksen, Laura & Kerwin, Jason & Reynoso, Natalia Ordaz & Sterck, Olivier, 2024. "Healthcare Appointments as Commitment Devices," IZA Discussion Papers 17070, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Rustamdjan Hakimov & C.-Philipp Heller & Dorothea Kübler & Morimitsu Kurino, 2021. "How to Avoid Black Markets for Appointments with Online Booking Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(7), pages 2127-2151, July.
    4. Lingbo Huang & Tracy Xiao Liu & Jun Zhang, 2023. "Born to wait? A study on allocation rules in booking systems," Discussion Papers 2023-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    5. Derksen, Laura & Kerwin, Jason Theodore & Reynoso, Natalia Ordaz & Sterck, Olivier, 2021. "Appointments: A More Effective Commitment Device for Health Behaviors," SocArXiv y8gh7, Center for Open Science.
    6. Atayev, Atabek & Caspari, Gian & Hillenbrand, Adrian & Klein, Thilo, 2023. "Tapping into people's impatience for better environmental subsidies," ZEW policy briefs 04/2023, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    7. Nikhil Agarwal & Eric Budish, 2021. "Market Design," NBER Working Papers 29367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021. "Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488.
    9. Eric Budish & Judd B. Kessler, 2022. "Can Market Participants Report Their Preferences Accurately (Enough)?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1107-1130, February.

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    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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