Hanging Together or Hanged Separately: The Strategic Power of Coalitions where Bargaining Occurs with Incomplete Information
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DOI: 10.1177/0022002713487319
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Vincent Anesi & Peter Buisseret, 2023.
"The Politics of Bargaining as a Group,"
DEM Discussion Paper Series
23-12, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
- Vincent Anesi & Peter Buisseret, 2023. "The Politics of Bargaining as a Group," CESifo Working Paper Series 10823, CESifo.
- Anesti, Vincent & Buisseret, Peter, 2023. "The Politics of Bargaining as a Group," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 81, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
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Keywords
bargaining; incomplete information; coalitions; groups; strategic bargaining power;All these keywords.
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