Optimal Rent Extraction in Pre-Industrial England and France – Default Risk and Monitoring Costs
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- Metin M. CoÅŸgel & Thomas J. Miceli, 2009.
"Tax Collection in History,"
Public Finance Review, , vol. 37(4), pages 399-420, July.
- Metin M. Cosgel & Thomas J. Miceli, 2007. "Tax Collection in History," Working papers 2007-48, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2008.
- Gonzales-Eiras, Martín & Niepelt, Dirk, 2004.
"Sustaining Social Security,"
Seminar Papers
731, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Dirk Niepelt & Martin Gonzalez-Eiras, 2007. "Sustaining Social Security," 2007 Meeting Papers 95, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Martin Gonzalez-Eiras & Dirk Niepelt, 2004. "Sustaining Social Security," 2004 Meeting Papers 199, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Martin Gonzalez Eiras & Dirk Niepelt, 2004. "Sustaining Social Security," Working Papers 72, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jun 2004.
- Martín Gonzalez-Eiras & Dirk Niepelt, 2005. "Sustaining Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series 1494, CESifo.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HIS-2005-08-13 (Business, Economic and Financial History)
- NEP-PBE-2005-08-13 (Public Economics)
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