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Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership

Author

Listed:
  • Athanassoglou, Stergios
  • Brams, Steven J.
  • Sethuraman, Jay

Abstract

We study the problem of dissolving an equal-entitlement partnership when the objective is to minimize maximum regret. We initially focus on the family of linear-pricing mechanisms and derive regret-optimizing strategies. We also demonstrate that there exist linear-pricing mechanisms satisfying ex-post efficiency. Next, we analyze a binary-search mechanism which is ex-post individually rational. We discuss connections with the standard Bayesian-Nash framework for both linear and binary-search mechanisms. On a more general level, we show that if entitlements are unequal, ex-post efficiency and ex-post individual rationality impose significant restrictions on permissible mechanisms. In particular, they rule out both linear and binary-search mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Athanassoglou, Stergios & Brams, Steven J. & Sethuraman, Jay, 2008. "Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership," MPRA Paper 12776, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:12776
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yigal Gerchak & J. David Fuller, 1992. "Optimal Value Declaration in "Buy-Sell" Situations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(1), pages 48-56, January.
    2. Georgia Perakis & Guillaume Roels, 2008. "Regret in the Newsvendor Model with Partial Information," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 56(1), pages 188-203, February.
    3. Linhart, P. B. & Radner, R., 1989. "Minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 152-178, June.
    4. Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson, 1983. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 835-851, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ludwig Ensthaler & Thomas Giebe & Jianpei Li, 2014. "Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(2), pages 127-150, June.
    2. Stefano Galavotti & Nozomu Muto & Daisuke Oyama, 2011. "On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 87-123, September.
    3. Van Essen, Matt & Wooders, John, 2016. "Dissolving a partnership dynamically," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 212-241.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Partnership dissolution; minimax regret; fair division; allocative efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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