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Cognitive effort of voters under three different voting methods - an experimental study

Author

Listed:
  • Marcin Malawski
  • Krzysztof Przybyszewski
  • Honorata Sosnowska

Abstract

This paper deals with the comparison of the processes of decision making by voters under the approval voting rule (in two variants: classical and categorization) and majority rule. Under the majority rule, each voter chooses a single alternative. Under approval voting, they can vote for as many alternatives as they wish. Under the categorization method, they divide alternatives into three groups: approvable, not approvable and neutral. We conducted a process tracing experiment with respondents choosing an office manager from 13 candidates characterized by 14 attributes. The process of collecting information on candidates from the data presented on the screen was observed by a coordinator. For this experiment, the concept of cognitive effort was defined as the quantity of information gathered. The cognitive effort made under the three methods was compared. The highest cognitive effort was observed in the case of the categorization method and the lowest in the case of approval voting.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcin Malawski & Krzysztof Przybyszewski & Honorata Sosnowska, 2010. "Cognitive effort of voters under three different voting methods - an experimental study," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 20(3-4), pages 69-79.
    • Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:3-4:y:2010:p:69-79:id:170
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 831-847, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Honorata Sosnowska, 2013. "The Rules for the Jury of the Fryderyk Chopin Piano Competition as a Non Standard Voting Rule," Collegium of Economic Analysis Annals, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis, issue 32, pages 23-31.
    2. repec:wut:journl:v:3-4:y:2011:id:1014 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Krzysztof Przybyszewski & Monika Rzeska & Honorata Sosnowska, 2011. "Cognitive properties of approval voting. An experimental approach," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 21(3-4), pages 21-34.

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