IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wsi/igtrxx/v09y2007i03ns0219198907001515.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Consensus Value For Games In Partition Function Form

Author

Listed:
  • YUAN JU

    (School of Economic and Management Studies, Keele University, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG, United Kingdom)

Abstract

This paper studies a procedural and axiomatic extension of the consensus value [cf. Juet al.(2007)] to the class of partition function form games. This value is characterized as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, complete symmetry, the quasi-null player property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided. Moreover, it is shown that the consensus value satisfies individual rationality under a superadditivity condition, and well balances the tradeoff between coalitional effects and externality effects. In this respect, explicit differences with other solution concepts are indicated.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuan Ju, 2007. "The Consensus Value For Games In Partition Function Form," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(03), pages 437-452.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:03:n:s0219198907001515
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001515
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198907001515
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1142/S0219198907001515?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.
    2. Kim Hang Pham Do & Henk Norde, 2007. "The Shapley Value For Partition Function Form Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 353-360.
    3. R. M. Thrall & W. F. Lucas, 1963. "N‐person games in partition function form," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(1), pages 281-298, March.
    4. Bolger, E M, 1989. "A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(1), pages 37-44.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Borm, Peter & Ju, Yuan & Wettstein, David, 2015. "Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 236-254.
    2. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, September.
    3. Ju, Yuan & Borm, Peter, 2008. "Externalities and compensation: Primeval games and solutions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 367-382, February.
    4. Joss Erick Sánchez-Pérez, 2023. "An elementary transfers procedure for sharing the joint surplus in games with externalities/Un procedimiento elemental de transferencias para repartir el excedente conjunto en juegos con externalidade," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 38(2), pages 317-332.
    5. Macho-Stadler, Inés & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2018. "Values for environments with externalities – The average approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 49-64.
    6. Peter Borm & Yukihiko Funaki & Yuan Ju, 2020. "The Balanced Threat Agreement for Individual Externality Negotiation Problems," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 67-85, November.
    7. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2009. "Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 307-330, May.
    8. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm, 2006. "A Non-cooperative Approach to the Compensation Rules for Primeval Games," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2006/18, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
    9. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.
    10. Joss Sánchez-Pérez, 2017. "A decomposition for the space of games with externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(1), pages 205-233, March.
    11. Joss Sánchez-Pérez, 2014. "An application of the representations of symmetric groups to characterizing solutions of games in partition function form," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 24(2), pages 97-122.
    12. Sanchez-Perez, Joss, 2015. "A decomposition for the space of games with externalities," MPRA Paper 67932, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrea Caggese & Ander Pérez-Orive, 2017. "Capital Misallocation and Secular Stagnation," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-009, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Ju, Yuan & Borm, Peter, 2008. "Externalities and compensation: Primeval games and solutions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 367-382, February.
    3. Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M., 2006. "A Non-cooperative Approach to the Compensation Rules for Primeval Games," Other publications TiSEM 0bc72bc7-9350-48e3-90c4-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2017. "Extensions of the Shapley value for Environments with Externalities," Working Papers 1002, Barcelona School of Economics.
    5. Macho-Stadler, Inés & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2018. "Values for environments with externalities – The average approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 49-64.
    6. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, September.
    7. J. M. Alonso-Meijide & M. Álvarez-Mozos & M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro & A. Jiménez-Losada, 2021. "Marginality and convexity in partition function form games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 94(1), pages 99-121, August.
    8. Grabisch, Michel & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2012. "A coalition formation value for games in partition function form," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 221(1), pages 175-185.
    9. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Licun Xue, 2015. "Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(2), pages 315-343, October.
    10. Michel Grabisch, 2010. "The lattice of embedded subsets," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00457827, HAL.
    11. Roger A McCain, 2013. "Value Solutions in Cooperative Games," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 8528, August.
    12. Peter Borm & Yukihiko Funaki & Yuan Ju, 2020. "The Balanced Threat Agreement for Individual Externality Negotiation Problems," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 67-85, November.
    13. Fukuda, E. & Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R. & Muto, S., 2002. "Compromising in Partition Function Form Games and Cooperation in Perfect Extensive Form," Discussion Paper 2002-117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    14. Frank Huettner & André Casajus, 2019. "Marginality, dividends, and the value in games with externalities," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-19-01, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
    15. Fukuda, E. & Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R. & Muto, S., 2002. "Compromising in Partition Function Form Games and Cooperation in Perfect Extensive Form," Other publications TiSEM 9374032a-efac-43dd-a3db-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. Maria Ekes, 2013. "Application of Generalized Owen Value for Voting Games in Partition Function Form," Collegium of Economic Analysis Annals, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis, issue 32, pages 43-53.
    17. Andr'e Casajus & Yukihiko Funaki & Frank Huettner, 2024. "Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities," Papers 2402.00394, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    18. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ehlers, Lars & Kar, Anirban, 2010. "Externalities, potential, value and consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2380-2411, November.
    19. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2010. "Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 177-184, March.
    20. Geoffroy de Clippel & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1413-1436, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Partition function form games; externality; Shapley value; consensus value; JEL Codes: C71; JEL Codes: D62; 91A06; 91A12;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:03:n:s0219198907001515. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tai Tone Lim (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.