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Externalities and compensation : Primeval games and solutions

Author

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  • Ju, Y.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Borm, P.E.M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

The classical literature (Pigou (1920), Coase (1960), Arrow (1970)) and the relatively recent studies (cf. Varian (1994)) associate the externality problem with efficiency. This paper focuses explicitly on the compensation problem in the context of externalities. To capture the features of inter-individual externalities, this paper constructs a new game-theoretic framework: primeval games. These games are used to design normative compensation rules for the underlying compensation problems: the marginalistic rule, the concession rule, and the primeval rule. Characterizations of the marginalistic rule and the concession rule are provided and specific properties of the primeval rule are studied.
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Suggested Citation

  • Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M., 2008. "Externalities and compensation : Primeval games and solutions," Other publications TiSEM f6e1bcfc-f2a6-4fc7-ac90-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:f6e1bcfc-f2a6-4fc7-ac90-7ad4e0bbf8aa
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yuan Ju, 2007. "The Consensus Value For Games In Partition Function Form," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(03), pages 437-452.
    2. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.
    3. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    4. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm, 2006. "A Non-cooperative Approach to the Compensation Rules for Primeval Games," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2006/18, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
    5. Kim Hang Pham Do & Henk Norde, 2007. "The Shapley Value For Partition Function Form Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 353-360.
    6. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2009. "Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 307-330, May.
    7. R. M. Thrall & W. F. Lucas, 1963. "N‐person games in partition function form," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(1), pages 281-298, March.
    8. Ju, Y., 2004. "Cooperation, compensation and transition," Other publications TiSEM 1c03cb9e-170c-43fb-a37a-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Varian, Hal R, 1994. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well-Informed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1278-1293, December.
    10. Bolger, E M, 1989. "A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(1), pages 37-44.
    11. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2004. "Sharing the surplus: A just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 611.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Borm & Yukihiko Funaki & Yuan Ju, 2020. "The Balanced Threat Agreement for Individual Externality Negotiation Problems," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 67-85, November.
    2. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2009. "Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 307-330, May.
    3. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm, 2006. "A Non-cooperative Approach to the Compensation Rules for Primeval Games," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2006/18, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
    4. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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