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Application of Generalized Owen Value for Voting Games in Partition Function Form

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Ekes

    (Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie)

Abstract

In the paper we present an application of the generalized Owen value, defined in our former work, for partition function form games. We apply this value to simple games, modeling multicandidate or multioptional voting. We also present an example of application of this concept to measuring the voting power of deputies in the Polish Sejm.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Ekes, 2013. "Application of Generalized Owen Value for Voting Games in Partition Function Form," Collegium of Economic Analysis Annals, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis, issue 32, pages 43-53.
  • Handle: RePEc:sgh:annals:i:32:y:2013:p:43-53
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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