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Emporiophobia (Fear of Markets): Cooperation or Competition?

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  • Paul H. Rubin

Abstract

Widespread emporiophobia (fear of markets) has important policy implications, since it leads voters to demand anti‐market policies. There are many reasons for this anti‐market attitude; however, economists could reduce emporiophobia if we stressed cooperation rather than competition in writings and policy discussions. In a sample of introductory textbooks, competition is mentioned on average eight times as often as cooperation. The fundamental economic unit is the transaction, and transactions are cooperative. The benefit of a market economy—increased consumer surplus—comes from cooperation through transactions, not from competition. Competition in a market economy is competition for the right to cooperate. Competition is important because it guarantees that the best cooperators will win and because it establishes the efficient terms for cooperation, but cooperation is fundamental. For most people, competition has negative connotations since it focuses on losers, while cooperation implies a win–win situation. Other implications involve the morality of the market, “giving back,” and characteristics of market failures.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul H. Rubin, 2014. "Emporiophobia (Fear of Markets): Cooperation or Competition?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(4), pages 875-889, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:80:y:2014:i:4:p:875-889
    DOI: 10.4284/0038-4038-2013.287
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