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The fee structure in franchising: a property rights view

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  • Windsperger, Josef

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  • Windsperger, Josef, 2001. "The fee structure in franchising: a property rights view," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 219-226, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:73:y:2001:i:2:p:219-226
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    1. Rajiv Lal, 1990. "Improving Channel Coordination Through Franchising," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 9(4), pages 299-318.
    2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
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    4. Bernard L Simonin, 1999. "Transfer of Marketing Know-How in International Strategic Alliances: An Empirical Investigation of the Role and Antecedents of Knowledge Ambiguity," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 30(3), pages 463-490, September.
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    6. Francine Lafontaine, 1992. "Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 263-283, Summer.
    7. Brickley, James A. & Dark, Frederick H., 1987. "The choice of organizational form The case of franchising," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 401-420, June.
    8. Nathalie Lazaric & Lugi Marengo, 2000. "Towards a characterization of knowledge and assets created in technological agreements: some empirical evidence in the automobile-robotics sector," Post-Print hal-00457137, HAL.
    9. Lafontaine, Francine, 1993. "Contractual Arrangements as Signaling Devices: Evidence from Franchising," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 256-289, October.
    10. Dnes, Antony W, 1993. "A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 367-393, June.
    11. Lazaric, Nathalie & Marengo, Luigi, 2000. "Towards a Characterization of Assets and Knowledge Created in Technological Agreements: Some Evidence from the Automobile Robotics Sector," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 9(1), pages 53-86, March.
    12. Rubin, Paul H, 1978. "The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 223-233, April.
    13. Rao, Ram C & Srinivasan, Shubashri, 1995. "Why Are Royalty Rates Higher in Service-Type Franchises?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 7-31, Spring.
    14. Eric D. Darr & Linda Argote & Dennis Epple, 1995. "The Acquisition, Transfer, and Depreciation of Knowledge in Service Organizations: Productivity in Franchises," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(11), pages 1750-1762, November.
    15. Wimmer, Bradley S & Garen, John E, 1997. "Moral Hazard, Asset Specificity, Implicit Bonding, and Compensation: The Case of Franchising," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 544-554, July.
    16. Mathewson, G Frank & Winter, Ralph A, 1985. "The Economics of Franchise Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 503-526, October.
    17. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, 1998. "Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision," NBER Working Papers 6544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    19. Seth W. Norton, 1988. "Franchising, brand name capital, and the entrepreneurial capacity problem," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(S1), pages 105-114, June.
    20. Richard L. Daft & Robert H. Lengel, 1986. "Organizational Information Requirements, Media Richness and Structural Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(5), pages 554-571, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Freiwald, Nisa E. & Juranek, Steffen & Walz, Uwe, 2020. "On the economic geography of dual distribution — The case of McDonald’s in Germany," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    2. Cintya Lanchimba & Josef Windsperger & Muriel Fadairo, 2018. "Entrepreneurial orientation, risk and incentives: the case of franchising," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 163-180, January.
    3. Farhad Sadeh & Manish Kacker, 2018. "Quality signaling through ex-ante voluntary information disclosure in entrepreneurial networks: evidence from franchising," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 729-748, April.
    4. Blut, Markus & Backhaus, Christof & Heussler, Tobias & Woisetschläger, David M. & Evanschitzky, Heiner & Ahlert, Dieter, 2011. "What to Expect After the Honeymoon: Testing a Lifecycle Theory of Franchise Relationships," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 87(3), pages 306-319.
    5. Grünhagen, Marko & Zheng, Xu (Vivian) & Wang, Jeff Jianfeng, 2017. "When the Music Stops Playing: Post-litigation Relationship Dissolution in Franchising," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 138-153.
    6. López-Fernández, Begoña & López-Bayón, Susana, 2011. "Economic rents in franchising: Do they exist?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 195-198.
    7. Josef Windsperger, 2013. "The governance of franchising networks," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 27, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Pierre Fenies & Nikolay Tchernev & Samuel Lagrange, 2010. "A decisional modelling for supply chain management in network franchise: applied to franchise bakery networks," Post-Print hal-02459412, HAL.
    9. Esther Calderon-Monge & Ivan Pastor-Sanz & Pilar Huerta-Zavala, 2017. "Economic Sustainability in Franchising: A Model to Predict Franchisor Success or Failure," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(8), pages 1-16, August.
    10. Pierre Fenies & Samuel Lagrange & Frédéric Gautier, 2014. "A decisional modelling for network franchise management: application on french networks," Post-Print hal-02459446, HAL.
    11. Котляров И.Д., 2015. "Отбор Партнера По Лицензионному Соглашению," Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), vol. 51(2), pages 103-112, апрель.
    12. Semrau, Thorsten & Biemann, Torsten, 2022. "When sergeants can outrank generals: Person-organization fit and the performance of franchisees as agents of their franchisor," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 37(2).
    13. Josef Windsperger, 2003. "Complementarities and Substitutabilities in Franchise Contracting: Some Results from the German Franchise Sector," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 7(3), pages 291-313, September.

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